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Subsidizing Economic Segregation
Through the State and Local Tax
Deduction
Gladriel Shobe*
Economic segregation has increased over the past half-century. The trend of rich localities
getting richer while poor localities get poorer is particularly concerning because it limits upward
mobility and perpetuates intergenerational income inequality. This Article makes the novel
argument that the state and local tax deduction subsidizes economic segregation. It arrives at
that conclusion by showing that the “local tax deduction” provides a greater subsidy, per
capita, for wealthy, economically segregated localities because only those localities have a critical
mass of wealthy taxpayers who claim the deduction. This allows wealthy localities, but not
poor localities, to provide services at a cost less than face value to their residents. This Article
argues that the deduction’s subsidy for wealthy localities rewards and likely contributes to
economic segregation because it provides an incentive for the wealthy to segregate into wealthy,
subsidized localities over less segregated and less subsidized localities. This Article’s analysis
and arguments are particularly relevant in light of recent controversy surrounding the state
and local tax deduction, including the new $10,000 limit on the deduction, efforts to
circumvent this limitation, and congressional proposals to reform it.
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INTRODUCTION
Economic segregation—the uneven geographic distribution of income
groups—has increased over the past half-century among households with children.1
This trend is significant because economic segregation is both a cause and
consequence of income inequality, which is higher now than at any time since the
Great Depression,2 and compounds intergenerational income inequality for those

1. See Kendra Bischoff & Sean F. Reardon, Residential Segregation by Income, 1970-2009, in
DIVERSITY AND DISPARITIES: AMERICA ENTERS A NEW CENTURY 208, 209–10, 213 ( John R. Logan
ed., 2014) [ hereinafter Bischoff & Reardon, Residential Segregation by Income, 1970-2009 ]; SEAN
F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, CTR. FOR EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS, THE CONTINUING INCREASE
IN INCOME SEGREGATION, 2007–2012, at 1 (2016); Ann Owens, Inequality in Children’s
Contexts: Income Segregation of Households with and Without Children, 81 AM. SOCIO. REV. 549, 550
(2016) [ hereinafter Owens, Inequality in Children’s Contexts ] (“Rising income segregation between
neighborhoods is a story about families with children . . . .”); infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
2. See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519 (2016); Kathryn M. Neckerman

First to Printer _Shobe.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

SUBSIDIZING ECONOMIC SEGREGATION

11/30/20 9:10 PM

541

who live in predominately poor localities.3 Scholars have studied the causes and
effects of economic segregation, and the government has implemented programs
aimed at decreasing economic segregation, but they have not considered an
important way that federal tax policy subsidizes economic segregation. This Article
fills a significant gap in the literature by exploring the relationship between
economic segregation and the state and local tax deduction, one of the federal
government’s largest tax expenditures.4 In doing so, it provides a new perspective
that should cause policymakers and scholars to reconsider how they think about
the deduction.
The state and local tax deduction allows taxpayers to deduct the state and local
taxes they pay from their federal taxable income, thereby reducing their overall
federal tax liability. The deduction costs the federal government approximately $100
billion each year.5 The magnitude of the deduction has brought it to the center of
political and academic debate, especially over the past three years. In order to fund
tax cuts in other areas, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) controversially placed a
new, temporary $10,000 cap on the state and local tax deduction, which taxpayers

& Florencia Torche, Inequality: Causes and Consequences, 33 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 335, 337–38 (2007)
(discussing the causes and negative ramifications of income inequality).
3. See infra Part I; Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones & Sonya
R. Porter, The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood Roots of Social Mobility (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25147, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/
w25147/w25147.pdf [ https://perma.cc/58UQ-CEUY ] (“Children’s outcomes vary sharply across
nearby areas: for children with parents at the 25th percentile of the [national] income distribution, the
standard deviation of mean household income at age 35 is $5,000 across tracts within counties.”);
Jonathan Rothwell, The Neighborhood Effect: Localities and Upward Mobility, BROOKINGS (Nov. 12,
2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2014/11/12/the-neighborhoodeffect-localities-and-upward-mobility [ https://perma.cc/NRN5-MLJG ] (“[I]nequality is partly
inherited via neighborhoods . . . .”); see also Emily Badger, The One Thing Rich Parents Do for Their Kids
that
Makes
All
the
Difference, WASH. POST (May 10, 2016, 3:30 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/10/the-incredible-impact-of-rich-parentsfighting-to-live-by-the-very-best-schools/ [ https://perma.cc/88PS-79SF ] (quoting Ann Owens that
“buying a neighborhood is probably one of the most important things you can do for your kid.
. . . There’s mixed evidence on whether buying all this other stuff matters, too. But buying a
neighborhood basically provides huge advantages.”).
4. A tax expenditure is a “provision of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion,
exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax,
or a deferral of tax liability.” Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2
U.S.C. § 622(3) (2006). Scholars have debated the merits of tax expenditures as a tool of federal policy.
See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Lily L. Batchelder, Fred
T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits,
59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 49 (2006).
5. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-34-18, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2017–2021 (2018); see also Briefing Book, TAX POL’Y CTR., https:/
/www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-largest-tax-expenditures
[ https://perma.cc/
KC34-DZWH ] ( last visited Apr. 6, 2020 ) (“The cost of the deduction of state and local income, sales,
and property taxes will decline from $100.9 billion in 2017 to only $21.2 billion in 2019 because of the
increase in the standard deduction and because the tax deduction is [temporarily] limited to no more
than $10,000 per tax return.”).
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had previously been able to deduct without limit.6 This change is projected to raise
approximately $668 billion in new taxes over ten years.7 In response to this cap,
certain states and localities unsuccessfully sued to attempt to restore the full
deduction, and the House of Representatives has passed bills that would temporarily
restore the deduction (though the bills are highly unlikely to pass in the Senate).8
Given the significance of and political contention surrounding the state and
local tax deduction, much has been written about its effects and normative
desirability.9 This Article adds a significant new wrinkle to this longstanding and
ongoing debate by making the novel argument that the local half of the deduction
serves to subsidize economic segregation. This Article develops that argument by
raising two separate, but related, questions about the relationship between economic
segregation and the state and local tax deduction. First, how does economic
segregation affect who, geographically and socioeconomically, is subsidized by the
state and local tax deduction? Second, does the state and local tax deduction reward
economic segregation, and if so, may the deduction serve as a contributing factor
to the rise in economic segregation? This Article argues that the answer to each
question is yes, which in turn has significance for how scholars and policymakers
should think about how this expensive and important federal tax expenditure should
be structured.
Starting with the first question, this Article argues that the local tax deduction,
which accounts for approximately half of the state and local tax deduction, provides
a greater subsidy, per capita, for wealthy, economically segregated localities than it

6. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); I.R.C. § 164(b)(6)
(West 2007).
7. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 684 (2017) (Conf. Rep.) (calculating the amount that the federal
government would save as a result of the $10,000 ceiling and stating that the ceiling constitutes the
“lion’s share” of the $668 billion in tax expenditure savings). The remainder of the $1.5 trillion tax
overhaul was funded by a combination of increased federal debt and dozens of other, smaller
revenue-raising provisions, including new limitations on the deductibility of home mortgage interest.
8. See Vill. of Scarsdale v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 1:2019cv06654 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2019)
( Justia, Dockets & Filings); State v. Mnuchin, No. 1:18-cv-6427 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2019) ( Justia, US
Law); Restoring Tax Fairness for States and Localities Act, H.R. 5377, 116th Cong. (2019); Shahar Ziv,
Stimulus Update: Dems Cut $1.2 Trillion from Heroes Act: Propose $2.2 Trillion Stimulus Package,
FORBES (Sept. 29, 2020, 9:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/shaharziv/2020/09/29/stimulusupdate-dems-cut-12-trillion-from-heroes-act-propose-22-trillion-stimulus-package/?sh=7ba84d8d57a9
[ https://perma.cc/CBU2-8L4J ].
9. For examples of literature that explore the debates surrounding the state and local tax
deduction, but which do not address its relationship to economic segregation, see Ruth Mason,
Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1021–23 (2011); Brian Galle, Federal Fairness
to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the “SALT” Deduction, 106
MICH. L. REV. 805, 813 (2008); Julie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 319, 332 (2003) (“A commonly expressed fear is that the elimination of the deduction
for state and local taxes will reduce subordinate governments’ ability to generate tax revenue.”); Louis
Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax,
82 VA. L. REV. 413, 417, 484–90 (1996) (analyzing the effects of the state and local tax deduction as a
subsidy); William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309,
366–67 (1972).
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does for economically heterogeneous or less wealthy localities.10 It supports this
claim by showing how the deduction (i) predominantly benefits wealthy, itemizing
taxpayers by allowing them to reduce the taxes they pay and (ii) acts as a subsidy
from the federal government to localities because the deduction effectively gives
taxpayers a discount on their local tax rates, allowing localities to charge higher taxes
(and provide better goods and services) than they could in the absence of a
deduction. It then asks the critical questions: Which localities are subsidized by the
local tax deduction, and should they be? This Article argues that the local tax
deduction disproportionately subsidizes wealthy, economically segregated localities
because only the relatively wealthy can deduct their local taxes and benefit from the
local tax deduction on their tax returns; therefore, only localities with a critical mass
of relatively wealthy taxpayers can charge higher taxes (at the expense of all
taxpayers) as a result of the deduction.11 In contrast, taxpayers in poor localities,
which are comprised primarily of non-itemizing taxpayers, pay full or close to full
price for their local goods and services because poor localities receive little to no
subsidy from the local tax deduction.
To illustrate the effect of the local tax deduction on wealthy localities, it is
helpful to consider local schools, which are one of the most significant local tax
expenditures.12 There are certain schools where almost every parent claims the
deduction and other schools where no, or very few, parents claim the deduction.13
Wealthy localities, where most of the households claim the deduction, can charge
higher taxes because each dollar charged costs the itemizing residents less than a
dollar, and therefore wealthy localities receive a federal subsidy for their local

10. One reason this Article’s insights about the local tax deduction have not been discussed in
prior academic literature is that scholars and policy makers almost always discuss the state and local tax
deduction as one deduction, and therefore have not separately analyzed the federal deduction for local
taxes and the federal deduction for state taxes. In fact, it is so common to discuss the two halves of the
deduction as one that it is often reduced to the acronym “SALT” deduction. See, e.g., Galle, supra note
9; Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State
and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389 (2004); Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political
Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895 (1992); Bruce Bartlett, The Deduction for State
and Local Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
08/13/the-deduction-for-state-and-local-taxes/?mtrref=www.google.com&assetType=REGIWALL
[ https://perma.cc/8LG2-NXWB ] (“The federal deduction for state and local taxes, in the tax world
often called the Salt deduction, is among the largest in the tax code . . . .”).
11. See infra note 116 (discussing what constitutes a “critical mass” for purposes of this Article).
12. Economic segregation has significantly increased among households with children but has
changed little among childless households, strongly indicating that the rise in economic segregation is a
result of parents with school-age children “buying” better schools for their children. See Owens,
Inequality in Children’s Contexts, supra note 1.
13. See Richard Voith, Does the Federal Tax Treatment of Housing Affect the Pattern of
Metropolitan Development?, BUS. REV., Feb. 1999, at 9 (“For a community composed of
moderate-income residents who find it most advantageous to use the standard deduction, the local
residents would pay the full $1 million for school funding [for a school to receive $1 million in
school benefits].”).
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schools as a result of the deduction.14 However, schools in localities where no or
very few households claim the deduction receive little to no benefit from the
deduction because those localities do not have a federal subsidy that allows them to
charge taxes at a discounted rate in the way wealthy localities do.15
This Article asserts that the answer to the second question—whether the state
and local tax deduction rewards or contributes to economic segregation—is that the
local tax half of the state and local tax deduction certainly rewards, and likely
contributes to, economic segregation.16 By disproportionately subsidizing wealthy,
economically segregated localities, the deduction rewards taxpayers for economic
segregation, thereby creating an incentive for taxpayers to economically segregate.
Although the subsidy created by the deduction is only one of many factors that go
into the complicated calculation of where to live, the quality of local goods and
services (and in particular, the quality of local schools), relative to their cost in taxes,
undoubtedly goes into the calculation.17 Therefore, the deduction, which lowers the
cost of local goods and services for wealthy, economically segregated localities,
changes the cost-benefit analysis in favor of those localities for those who can
afford to choose to live there. If at least some taxpayers have responded to this
incentive to choose a wealthy, economically segregated locality over another less
economically segregated locality, then the local tax deduction has contributed, at
least in some part, to the rise in economic segregation. Moreover, the deduction
rewards those whose decisions are unaffected by the deduction but would choose
to live in a wealthy locality even in the absence of the deduction.
To be clear, this Article does not purport to empirically explain how each
locality in the United States works. Each locality is different in its economic
composition and taxing and spending patterns, and there are therefore exceptions
to any attempt to explain how and why localities behave like they do. The goal of
this Article is to begin a discussion about the undertheorized local tax deduction
and its relationship to economic segretation and income inequality. While this
Article focuses on the theory behind the deduction and economic segregation, not
on empirically proving a connection, there is anecdotal evidence to support a

14. Id. (“In high-income communities, property tax deductibility lowers the cost of providing
local amenities, such as schools and parks, that are financed by property taxes . . . .”).
15. Id. (“For a community composed of moderate-income residents who find it most
advantageous to use the standard deduction, the local residents would pay the full $1 million for school
funding [for a school to receive $1 million in school benefits].”).
16. This Article explains that there are two rewards for economic segregation—the reward
explained in the text above and the reward that comes because when the wealthy live in wealthy,
economically homogeneous localities, they are able to minimize the amount of redistribution from them
to the less wealthy. See infra Section II.C.
17. See Shelly Hagan & Wei Lu, These Are the Wealthiest Towns in the U.S., BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 13, 2019, 7:03 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-13/silicon-valleysuburb-snags-richest-spot-in-u-s-for-third-year [ https://perma.cc/JR95-HGV7 ] (explaining that
Scarsdale is the second wealthiest locality in the United States and quotes Scarsdale Mayor Dan
Hochvert, a 40-year resident, “We moved here, as many did, because of the outstanding school system.
. . . That’s one of the primary drivers.”).
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connection.18 Some of this ancedotal evidence arises from the effects of the recent
and highly controversial $10,000 limit on the deductibility of state and local taxes.19
A headline from the Wall Street Journal is telling: “Democrats and Affluent Suburbs
Join to Fight Tax-Break Cap.”20 Scarsdale, the wealthiest locality in New York (with
an average household income of $417,335) filed a lawsuit on July 17, 2019,
challenging the validity of the cap.21 The fact that New York’s wealthiest locality
funded and filed this lawsuit, in connection with the fact that New York’s other
wealthy localities and school districts have formed a coalition to overturn the effects
of the $10,000 cap, indicates that wealthy localities have a larger stake in the
deductibility of local taxes than other localities.22 Comments by the residents of
Scarsdale are also telling: “[T]he denial of [a deduction] disproportionately hits
communities like mine,”23 “These regulations will cause real harm for villages like
Scarsdale,”24 and “I worry that the changes to SALT are going to destroy our way
of life . . . .”25 Furthermore, there is some evidence that the $10,000 cap has reduced
housing values in wealthy neighborhoods but has had no effect on housing values
in poor neighborhoods, indicating that the deduction disproportionately subsidizes
wealthy neighborhoods.26
Additional anecdotal evidence comes from wealthy communities that are part
of larger, economically heterogeneous localities deciding to separate to form their
own smaller, wealthy, economically homogenous cities and school districts.27 This

18. An empirical analysis of the magnitude of the deduction’s subsidy for wealthy, economically
segregated localities, and the related question of whether and to what extent the deduction has
contributed to the rise in economic segregation among households with children, is beyond the scope
of this Article. However, this Article lays the foundation and framework for future empirical scholarship
to test its arguments and conclusions.
19. See infra Part III.
20. Richard Rubin, Democrats and Affluent Suburbs Join to Fight Tax-Break Cap, WALL
ST. J. (June 25, 2019, 7:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-and-affluent-suburbs-jointo-fight-tax-break-cap-11561503637 [ https://perma.cc/N8ML-QU4M ].
21. See Vill. of Scarsdale v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 1:2019cv06654 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2019)
( Justia, Dockets & Filings); Hagan & Lu, supra note 17.
22. The coalition is comprised of New York’s wealthiest and, generally, most economically
segregated localities and school districts, including Scarsdale, Rye, Upper Brookeville, Pelham,
Bronxville, North Castle, Lewisboro, and Bedford. See Lauren Loricchio, States, Locality Sue to Overturn
IRS SALT Regs, 164 TAX NOTES FED. 590, 590 (2019).
23. Id. at 591 (quoting New York State Assembly member Amy Paulin).
24. Id.
25. See Jimmy Vielkind, New York Towns Gearing Up to Fight IRS Ruling on Local Taxes, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-towns-gearing-up-to-fightirs-ruling-on-local-taxes-1538319601 [ https://perma.cc/QWG9-3QU3 ].
26. See Jim Tankersley, The Trump Tax Cuts Were Supposed to Depress Housing Prices. They Haven’t.,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/business/housing-prices-taxlaw.html [ https://perma.cc/7Z93-99QA ] (finding that controlling for the other provisions of the
TCJA, only the state and local tax deduction had an effect on housing prices, and noting that the
changes are “contained to a few high-priced, highly taxed ZIP codes”).
27. See Adam Harris, The New Secession, ATL. (May 20, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
education/archive/2019/05/resegregation-baton-rouge-public-schools/589381/ [ https://perma.cc/
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trend, which has “rapidly accelerated,” allows the wealthy to economically segregate
without physically moving and “isolates their property-tax dollars in a new
district.”28 Because this form of economic segregation occurs by tax boundary
drawing, not moving truck, it indicates that the benefits of living in an economically
segregated locality, which are subsidized by the local tax deduction, are contributing
to this trend.29 Furthermore, even if each of these separations would have occurred
independently of the subsidy created by the local tax deduction, the deduction
nonetheless economically rewards, at the cost of all taxpayers, those who choose to
engage in this form of economic segregation.
This Article concludes by exploring how its insights should influence debates
about whether a deduction should exist, and if so, how it should be structured. It
makes the previously unrecognized point that to understand whether a deduction
for local taxes is merited, we need to look at the types of localities it subsidizes. It
argues that, from a tax policy perspective, a deduction for local taxes is justified if
it is shared with the less wealthy through redistribution (much like the charitable
deduction),30 which is often the case for taxpayers in large cities with economically
diverse populations and taxpayers in states that require wealthy localities to share
tax revenue with poorer localities.31 However, where the subsidy created by the local
tax deduction is captured primarily by those who receive a direct benefit for the
taxes they pay, which occurs the most frequently in wealthy, economically
segregated localities,32 then the deduction is significantly less justified because
taxpayers should not receive a deduction for what amounts to their own
consumption (the same way they do not get a deduction for purchasing a car or
clothes).33 When looked at this way, the question of whether to allow and how to
structure a deduction turns to the nature of the underlying localities the
deduction subsidizes.
The time is ripe to consider how to better structure the local deduction in light
of the recent tax reform’s effect on the deduction. This Article provides a new
perspective on the $10,000 cap on federal deductibility of state and local taxes and

LPT7-68JN ] (stating that the rate at which wealthy communities have separated to form their own
school districts has “rapidly accelerated in the past two years”).
28. Id.
29. See supra note 16.
30. See infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text (discussing tax policy justifications for
deductibility).
31. See infra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
32. For example, schools in wealthy neighborhoods often have more local tax funding than
schools in poor neighborhoods, even after accounting for transfers from the state and federal
government. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text; see also Ann Owens, Sean F. Reardon
& Christopher Jencks, Income Segregation Between Schools and School Districts, 53
AM. EDUC. RSCH. J. 1159, 1161–62 (2016) [ hereinafter Income Segregation Between Schools and School
Districts ] (“Income segregation thus implies variation in school funding between school districts. In
many states, these inequalities are partially or wholly offset by state and federal funding, but there are
still many states where funding remains correlated with local residents’ income and property values.”).
33. See infra note 120 (explaining why taxpayers should not get a deduction for consumption).
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proposes new approaches to deductibility that may be better tax policy than the
current limitation. These could include limiting deductibility of local taxes in
wealthy, economically segregated localities or continuing to subsidize wealthy,
economically segregated localities while increasing funding (perhaps in the form of
a credit) for relatively poor and economically heterogeneous localities that have
historically been less subsidized by the local tax deduction. Either of these options
would reduce the tax incentive to economically segregate by leveling the tax playing
field between localities.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the rise in economic
segregation in the United States and shows how economic segregation contributes
to intergenerational income inequality. Part II makes the claim that the local tax
deduction rewards the wealthy for segregating into wealthy localities by subsidizing
wealthy, economically homogeneous localities, and argues that this reward has likely
contributed to the rise in economic segregation. Part III analyzes the new $10,000
limit on the deductibility of state and local taxes and makes alternative proposals to
reform the deduction in ways that would reduce the deduction’s incentive for
economic segregation.
I. ECONOMIC SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Economic segregation—the uneven geographic distribution of income
groups—creates wealthy localities with superior local goods and services and poorer
localities with comparatively inferior local goods and services. Economic
segregation has significant social and economic ramifications, including the
perpetuation of intergenerational income inequality. This background on economic
segregation provides the foundation for Part II, which explores the ways that the
local tax deduction has incentivized and rewarded economic segregation.
A. Rising Economic Segregation
It is common knowledge that people choose to live in a particular area because
of the cost of housing in that area. Economic segregation occurs because housing
prices and rental costs vary but are usually clustered in localities, with high-cost
housing generally more closely surrounded by other high-cost housing and low-cost
housing generally more closely surrounded by other low-cost housing. Therefore,
high-income families typically choose to live in localities with other high-income
families, where they can afford housing, while low-income families typically live in
localities with other low-income families, where they can afford housing.34
Economic segregation among localities, neighborhoods, and school districts
has always existed, but it has increased markedly since 1970.35 During that time, it

34. Bischoff & Reardon, Residential Segregation by Income, 1970-2009, supra note 1.
35. The social science literature, which is the primary source for measuring economic
segregation, has taken several approaches to measuring economic segregation, with some using
neighborhoods and others using school districts or census tracts. Although these studies take different
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has become more common for the wealthy to live near the wealthy and for the poor
to live near the poor,36 and the percentage of the population living in the United
States’ poorest and wealthiest neighborhoods has more than doubled since 1970.37
In other words, lower-income households have become more likely to live in
localities with other low-income households, and higher-income households have
become more likely to live in localities with other high-income households.38
approaches to measuring economic segregation, overall, they show that economic segregation has
increased since 1970 among households with children. Although no study has measured economic
segregation by local taxing jurisdiction, in large part because the studies were not focused on the
relationship between taxes and economic segregation, the fact that economic segregation has increased
among school districts, which are often their own taxing jurisdictions, indicates that economic
segregation has also increased among taxing jurisdictions. See Income Segregation Between Schools and
School Districts, supra note 32 (finding that economic segregation has increased among school districts).
Even if (i) economic segregation had only increased among the neighborhoods and school districts as
measured by the social science literature, but not among local taxing jurisdictions (which seems highly
unlikely), or (ii) all the studies showing an increase in economic segregation were incorrect (which also
seems highly unlikely), the claims made in this Article in Parts II and III regarding the ways that the
local tax deduction rewards economic segregation would remain correct. For other articles that find
that economic segregation has increased over time, see Bischoff & Reardon, Residential Segregation by
Income, 1970-2009, supra note 1, at 214 (finding that “overall income segregation increased by
approximately 29 percent” from 1970 to 2010); SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, GROWTH
IN THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME, 1970-2009 (2011) [ hereinafter
REARDON & BISCHOFF, GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME,
1970-2009 ] (measuring economic segregation by using U.S. Census data and the American Community
Survey and comparing neighborhood median family income to metropolitan area median income); Tara
Watson, Inequality and the Measurement of Residential Segregation by Income in American Neighborhoods,
55 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 820 (2009); Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, The Rise of Residential Segregation
by Income, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/01/the-rise-ofresidential-segregation-by-income/ [ https://perma.cc/Q93A-4EPU ] (using census tracks for 1980 to
2010 as a proxy for what constitutes a neighborhood and finding that residential segregation has
increased since 1980). But see John R. Logan, Andrew Foster & Jun Ke, The Uptick in Income
Segregation: Real Trend or Random Sampling Variation?, 124 AM. J. SOCIO. 185, 185 (2018) (discussing
the ways that the census, which is the primary source of data used to calculate economic segregation,
relies on a reduced sample size that may exaggerate the upward trend for the 2000s).
36. REARDON & BISCHOFF, GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY
INCOME, 1970-2009, supra note 35, at abstract, 8 (defining affluent as those who make 1.5 times the
median family income, and poor as those who make less than .67 times the median family income of a
given metropolitan area, measuring the extent to which families in the top ten percent of earners lived
in separate neighborhoods, and concluding “[a]s overall income inequality grew in the last four decades,
high- and low-income families have become increasingly less likely to live near one another”); Fry
& Taylor, supra note 35 (defining low-income households as those making less than two-thirds of the
national median annual income, upper-income households as those making more than double the
national median annual income, and finding that “28% of lower-income households in 2010 were
located in a majority lower-income census tract, up from 23% in 1980, and that 18% of upper-income
households were located in a majority upper-income census tract, up from 9% in 1980”).
37. REARDON & BISCHOFF, GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY
INCOME, 1970-2009, supra note 35, at 11 (showing that in 1970, approximately fifteen percent of
families lived in neighborhoods that were classified as either wealthy or poor, and by 2007, thirty-one
percent of families lived in such neighborhoods).
38. Lower-income households have not been put into this situation by choice. Lower-income
households have more limited budgets than wealthier households and are, therefore, priced out of many
localities, even though they typically spend a higher percentage of their income on housing costs. See
Affordable
Housing,
HUD.GOV,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/
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Economic segregation is the most pronounced among the relatively wealthy, who
are more segregated than lower-income families.39 The increase in the number of
wealthy localities has led to an increase in the number of localities that are composed
almost exclusively of relatively wealthy families, and these localities almost always
have superior local public goods and services.40
Why have the wealthy segregated themselves? One cause is the overall increase
in income inequality.41 In a world with no income inequality, there could be no
economic segregation because every locality would have income homogeneity. But
affordablehousing
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20200801195446/https://www.hud.gov/
program_offices/comm_planning/affordablehousing/ ] ( last visited Aug. 1, 2020 ) (reporting that “[a]n
estimated 12 million renter and homeowner households now pay more than 50% of their annual
incomes for housing”). In addition, because local amenities, including local public schools, are priced
into housing costs, lower-income families are faced with different housing constraints than wealthier
households and are unable to pay the same amounts for any given package of local amenities. See
JONATHAN ROTHWELL, BROOKINGS, HOUSING COSTS, ZONING, AND ACCESS TO HIGH-SCORING
SCHOOLS
1
(2012),
https://brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0419_school_
inequality_rothwell.pdf [ https://perma.cc/C4AS-Z89X ] (reporting the standardized test scores for
high- and low-income students and that “housing costs an average of 2.4 times as much, or nearly
$11,000 more per year, near a high-scoring public school than near a low-scoring public school”);
Watson, supra note 35, at 822. For example, while a wealthy household may choose between different
size houses, each in good school districts, a lower-income family must often choose between safety,
and proximity to employment, childcare, and public transportation. In many cases, a choice about safety
may (logically) be a higher priority than living in a school district with higher rated schools. See Maya
Wesby, Why Rich Kids Become Rich Adults and Poor Kids Become Poor Adults, WILSON Q. (Aug. 13,
2015),
https://wilsonquarterly.com/stories/why-rich-kids-become-rich-adults-and-poor-kidsbecome-poor-adults/ [ https://perma.cc/6SVG-H9EF ] (noting that “where low-income families
focus on immediate needs, such as food and transportation, rich families invest more on future-oriented
purchases that will ensure their wellbeing”).
39. REARDON & BISCHOFF, GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY
INCOME, 1970-2009, supra note 35 at 1, 22 (“The affluent are more segregated from other Americans
than the poor are. That is, high-income families are much less likely to live in neighborhoods with
middle- and low-income families than low-income families are to live in neighborhoods with
middle- and high-income families. This has been true for the last 40 years. . . . During the last four
decades, the isolation of the rich has been consistently greater than the isolation of the poor.”).
40. See Fry & Taylor, supra note 35 (“18% of upper-income households were located in a
majority upper-income census tract, up from 9% in 1980.”); see also Emily Gersema, Neighborhood
Segregation Is Driven by Income Inequality, Choice of School Districts, USC NEWS (May 10, 2016), https:/
/news.usc.edu/99804/neighborhood-segregation-is-driven-by-income-inequality-and-choice-of-schooldistricts-study-finds/ [ https://perma.cc/J8TA-DKYS ] (discussing the rise in economic segregation
among families). The wealthiest of these neighborhoods have been referred to as “Super Zips.” See
CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960–2010 (2012); see also Ted
Mellnik & Carol Morello, Washington: A World Apart, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/sf/local/2013/11/09/washington-a-world-apart/?utm_term=.3a1a6e58ba57
[ https://perma.cc/A7FC-PHMX ] (explaining that “‘Super Zips’ . . . describe the country’s most
prosperous, highly educated demographic clusters. On average, they have a median household income
of $120,000, and 7 in 10 adults have college degrees”).
41. For articles discussing the correlation between rising economic segregation and rising
income inequality, see Bischoff & Reardon, Residential Segregation by Income, 1970-2009, supra note 1,
at 208 (“[W]e find that segregation has grown most rapidly in metropolitan areas characterized by
growing income inequality, growing proportions of children, and increasing average educational
attainment levels.”); see also Fry & Taylor, supra note 35 (discussing the increase in income inequality and
noting the increase in the number of upper- and lower-income census tracts).
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as income inequality increases, the rich have become richer and the poor have
become poorer.42 Consequently, economic segregation has increased as wealthy
localities have become wealthier and poorer localities have become poorer.43
However, increasing income inequality appears to only account for a portion of the
increase in economic segregation, with multiple studies concluding that economic
segregation has increased since 1970 among households with children, even when
controlling for increased income inequality.44 Therefore, the increase in economic
segregation seems to be due, at least in part, to an increase in the number of people
choosing to move to localities that are relatively economically homogeneous.
A primary reason why the wealthy prefer homogenous localities is that they
permit them to reduce economic redistribution, thereby allowing wealthy taxpayers
to more directly benefit from the local taxes they pay.45 In contrast, when the
wealthy pay local taxes in an economically heterogeneous locality, at least a portion
of their local taxes fund goods and services for less wealthy residents who do not
pay enough taxes to fund the local goods and services they consume. The ways in
which residents should be expected to sort into localities was famously modeled by
Charles Tiebout, who argued that in a perfectly competitive scenario, there would
be an equilibrium where people would sort into localities where the local goods and
services exactly matched the residents’ preferences.46 The Tiebout model views each
locality as a package of local public goods and services that residents pay for via
local taxes. If the goods and services provided and taxes charged do not perfectly
match a resident’s preferences, then that resident will move to a locality that does.
Although the Tiebout model relies on a number of assumptions that do not hold in
the real world, including that there are no costs associated with moving between
jurisdictions and that local public goods and tax burdens are the only factors people
consider when deciding where to live, it is a widely cited and useful model for
42. For articles documenting the rise in income inequality, see Saez & Zucman, supra note 2;
Drew DeSilver, U.S. Income Inequality, On Rise for Decades, Is Now Highest Since 1928, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/05/u-s-incomeinequality-on-rise-for-decades-is-now-highest-since-1928/[ https://perma.cc/3LW7-Y7Z8 ].
43. See Watson, supra note 35, at 822 (“[A]s inequality rises, the rich will be more likely to outbid
the poor for high-quality neighborhoods and the rich and poor will be less likely to live in close
proximity.”); Badger, supra note 3 (“[A]s income inequality has widened . . . the rich have more and
more money to spend on the real estate arms race to get into wealthy neighborhoods, where everyone
else is wealthy, too (and the same can be said of the local classrooms).”).
44. In theory, increasing income inequality could be the sole reason for increased economic
segregation. To illustrate, if income inequality increased, but no one moved, then there would still be
increased economic segregation because the wealthy localities would, on average, become wealthier
while the poor localities would, on average, become poorer. However, studies that control for increasing
income inequality have concluded that the increase in income inequality is not the sole reason for the
increase in economic segregation. See REARDON & BISCHOFF, GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL
SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME, 1970-2009, supra note 35, at 21 (controlling for increased
income inequality and concluding that “[b]y any of the measures we examine, segregation of families
by income has grown significantly in the last 40 years”); Watson, supra note 35 (showing that residential
segregation increased independently of rising income inequality).
45. See infra Section II.C.
46. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
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understanding individual’s decisions about where to live. The Tiebout model also
may help explain the phenomenon of increased economic segregation.47 Since 1970,
the United States has moved closer to a Tieboutian world where taxpayers,
especially the wealthy, sort themselves into economically homogeneous localities
where they are essentially purchasing local goods and services through their
local taxes.48
Of course, households perceive and evaluate local goods, services, and taxes
differently depending on their particular preferences. Each household weighs
factors such as the tax rate, the attractiveness of the homes in an area, educational
facilities, air quality, low crime, proximity to public transportation, local natural
resources, and any number of other factors differently. Generally, localities with
higher median housing costs generate higher tax revenue and therefore have
better-funded schools, safer neighborhoods, and better local amenities, such as
parks and other community facilities. Even though households weigh local goods
and services differently, the fact that, collectively, wealthy households have
increasingly chosen to move to wealthy, homogeneous localities indicates that
wealthy households have an increased desire to live in localities with superior goods
and services, or at least not to subsidize other less wealthy households.49 By moving
into wealthier and more segregated localities, these families are effectively
purchasing the goods and services of those localities via local property taxes.50
Although it is impossible to know how each household came to choose the
locality it lives in, there is one factor that appears to strongly influence households’
decisions to sort into homogeneous localities more than any other: local public
schools.51 A recent study by Ann Owens shows that income segregation between
neighborhoods is approximately twice as high among households with children as
47. Although other factors, including preferences for proximity to work, proximity to family,
characteristics of neighbors, etc., play a role in people’s decisions regarding where to live, there are
typically both wealthy and poor neighborhoods in the same greater metropolitan area that allow people
to accommodate these non-income economic preferences. See Patrick Bayer & Robert McMillan,
Tiebout Sorting and Neighborhood Stratification, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 1129 (2012) (showing that employment
geography and commuting costs are factors that affect where people choose to live and serve to bring
heterogeneous households together in the same neighborhoods).
48. See Bayer & McMillan, supra note 47.
49. See Steven N. Durlauf, A Theory of Persistent Income Inequality, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 75, 75
(1996) (stating that the benefits of superior local public schools plus the sociological effects connected
with living in wealthy neighborhoods has created “incentives for wealthier families to segregate
themselves into economically homogeneous neighborhoods”); Patrick Bayer, Robert McMillan & Kim
Rueben, An Equilibrium Model of Sorting in an Urban Housing Market (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 10865, 2004), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w10865/
w10865.pdf [ https://perma.cc/8L6T-LJMK ] (showing that wealthy families are willing to pay higher
housing prices in order to live in more homogeneous neighborhoods).
50. It is often said that you should buy the worst house in the best neighborhood. The rationale
behind that adage is that living in the best neighborhood you can afford gives you access to the best
local goods and services you can afford even though your home is cheaper than the surrounding homes.
51. See Bayer & McMillan, supra note 47, at 1142 (testing the factors that affect where people
choose to live and showing that “highly educated households tend to locate in neighborhoods with
better schools and lower crime . . . while the reverse is true for less-educated households . . . .”).
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it is for households without children, and that from 1990 to 2010, income
segregation increased approximately twenty percent among households with
children but changed little among households without children.52 The result is that
children face greater, and increasing, economic segregation compared to the overall
population.53 Studies have further confirmed that economic segregation has
increased among school districts.54 From these studies, it seems logical to conclude
that wealthy families have not only chosen to spend their additional income on
vacations or improvements to their existing home. Instead, the increase in income
inequality has provided the means for wealthier households to spend more on their
children, and one way they have done this is by moving to the best locality they can
afford, along with other wealthy households, which has become easier to navigate
as information regarding school quality has become more readily available.55 To put
this in Tiebout’s terms, households with children who have been the economic
beneficiaries of the rise in income inequality have used their additional income to
“vote with their feet” and purchase superior education for their children by moving
to wealthier, economically homogeneous school districts.56

52. Owens, Inequality in Children’s Contexts, supra note 1, at 550 (examining census data from 100
major U.S. metropolitan areas and concluding that “[i]ncome segregation between neighborhoods is
higher and increased by about 20 percent among families with children, but it changed little among
childless households, who make up the majority of U.S. households”).
53. In addition, wealthy families have increased their spending on young children while poor
families have not. See Sabino Kornrich, Inequalities in Parental Spending on Young Children: 1972 to
2010, 2 AERA OPEN 1, 1 (2016) (finding that parents at the top of the income distribution (primarily
those in the top two income deciles) increased their spending on young children from 1972 to 2010,
while parents at the bottom of the income distribution did not); Sabino Kornrich & Frank Furstenberg,
Investing in Children: Changes in Parental Spending on Children, 1972–2007, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 20
(2013) (“Our findings also show that investment grew more unequal over the study period: parents
near the top of the income distribution spent more in real dollars near the end of the 2000s than in the
early 1970s, and the gap in spending between rich and poor grew.”).
54. See Income Segregation Between Schools and School Districts, supra note 32.
55. See Owens, Inequality in Children’s Contexts, supra note 1, at 549 (“Rising income inequality
provided high-income households more resources, and parents used these resources to purchase
housing in particular neighborhoods, with residential decisions structured, in part, by school district
boundaries.”); see, e.g., Badger, supra note 3 (noting that most real estate sites list the grades for local
schools next to each property listing making it easier “to make sure you’re buying not only the best
home, but also the public schools with the best standardized test scores”).
56. Although the focus of this Article is segregation by income, racial segregation has been and
continues to be an important issue. This Article will focus primarily on economic segregation because
racial segregation is too complicated of an issue to tackle in an article that strives to cover the other
issues that are the focus of this Article, and because this Article strives to discuss and propose policies
that will reduce economic segregation, which would indirectly reduce racial segregation. For a further
discussion of the interrelationship between racial and economic segregation, see Ann Owens, Racial
Residential Segregation of School-Age Children and Adults: The Role of Schooling as a Segregating Force, 3
RUSSEL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 63 (2017); Fry & Taylor, supra note 35; REARDON & BISCHOFF,
GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME, 1970-2009, supra note 35,
at 23–24; Bischoff & Reardon, Residential Segregation by Income, 1970-2009, supra note 1, at 208 (“[W]e
find clear evidence that income segregation has grown rapidly, particularly in the last decade and
particularly among black and Hispanic families.”); Will Dobbie & Roland G. Fryer, Jr., Are High Quality
Schools Enough to Increase Achievement Among the Poor? Evidence from the Harlem Children’s Zone, 3
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B. Why Economic Segregation Matters
Economic segregation matters because it affects the distribution of resources
and social networks in ways that accentuate advantages for the wealthy and
compound disadvantages for the poor,57 in particular because of the strong
correlation between neighborhood average income and the quality of local public
schools.58 These advantages and disadvantages especially affect children, ensuring
that the problem of income inequality compounds in future generations.59 This
Section analyzes these effects.
1. Distribution of Resources
One way economic segregation helps the rich grow richer and the poor grow
poorer is through the unequal distribution of public and private resources. Because
taxes fund local resources, and because wealthy localities have higher local tax
revenues than poor localities, wealthy localities typically have better-funded schools,
parks, and other community facilities.60 In contrast, poor localities have lower tax
revenues, and therefore typically have fewer and less well-funded community
facilities. Therefore, income segregation results in a world where the wealthy have
better access to well-funded local resources.
The residents of wealthy localities benefit from economic segregation because
economic homogeneity allows wealthy households to fund public resources without
AM. ECON. J. 158 (2011) (suggesting that reducing economic segregation can significantly reduce racial
educational inequalities).
57. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson, Moving and the Neighborhood Glass Ceiling, 337 SCI. 1464 (2012)
(“From Victorian London to present-day America, research has shown links between neighborhood
poverty and outcomes such as crime, economic dependency, poor physical health, teenage pregnancy,
and school dropout.”).
58. See Rothwell, supra note 3.
59. The locality one grows up in has a significant influence on an individual’s physical, social,
educational, and economic outcome. See, e.g., Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The
Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity
Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 855, 899 (2016) [ hereinafter Chetty et al., Effects of Exposure ] (finding
that young children who move to low-poverty areas “are more likely to attend college and have
substantially higher incomes as adults” and “are less likely to become single parents themselves,
suggesting that some of the benefits . . . will persist into the following generation”); Julia Burdick-Will,
Jens Ludwig, Stephen W. Raudenbush, Robert J. Sampson, Lisa Sanbonmatsu & Patrick Sharkey,
Converging Evidence for Neighborhood Effects on Children’s Test Scores: An Experimental,
Quasi-Experimental, and Observational Comparison, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUALITY,
SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 255 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011);
Patrick Sharkey & Jacob W. Faber, Where, When, Why, and For Whom Do Residential Contexts Matter?
Moving Away from the Dichotomous Understanding of Neighborhood Effects, 40 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 559
(2014) (discussing the many disadvantages of growing up in poor neighborhoods); Tama Leventhal
& Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, The Neighborhoods They Live In: The Effects of Neighborhood Residence on Child
and Adolescent Outcomes, 126 PSYCH. BULL. 309 (2000) (reviewing the effects of neighborhood
residence on child and adolescent well-being).
60. Approximately one-third of state revenue comes from the federal government, and
approximately one-third of local revenue comes from state government. Therefore, the federal
government indirectly subsidizes localities because it transfers revenue to states, which then transfer a
portion of that federal tax revenue to localities.
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subsidizing those resources for the poor.61 When wealthy taxpayers live in localities
that include both wealthy and poor residents, then the wealthy residents, who pay
more in local property taxes than poor residents, subsidize local goods and services
for poor residents. In contrast, when wealthy taxpayers live in wealthy, economically
homogenous localities, the wealthy taxpayers avoid paying that subsidy (or at least
pay a much smaller subsidy) and are therefore able to receive a more direct benefit
from the local taxes they pay.62
Schools are the most important public resource that affect the economic
outcomes for those living in a particular locality,63 and approximately half of public
revenue spent on primary and secondary education is generated through local
taxes.64 Although school choice policies somewhat weaken the link between the
localities children live in and the schools they attend, most public school students
attend their neighborhood public school.65 Although social scientists have debated
the extent to which a better education affects children’s economic outcomes and
the extent to which economic outcomes are affected by other factors,66 there is a
consensus that better education strongly correlates with higher incomes, higher
social status, greater political participation and influence, and better health.67
Because there is a strong correlation between school quality and neighborhood

61. See Durlauf, supra note 49, at 90 (“Wealthy families have an incentive to isolate themselves
from the rest of the economy in order to provide the highest level of education for their children at the
lowest cost.”).
62. For further discussion of the economic rewards that the wealthy receive when they
economically segregate, see infra Sections II.B–C.
63. A household has to move to a neighborhood with better schools in order to significantly
impact its economic prospects, and moving to wealthier neighborhoods alone is insufficient to have a
significant impact on household earnings. See Rothwell, supra note 3.
64. See, e.g., MATTHEW M. CHINGOS & KRISTIN BLAGG, URB. INST., DO POOR KIDS GET
THEIR FAIR SHARE OF SCHOOL FUNDING? 1 (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/90586/school_funding_brief_1.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/9CQX-W6A3 ]
(“Local
governments provided more than 80 percent of school funding in the 1920s, but they have been roughly
equal partners with state governments since the 1970s.”); Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and
Local Tax Deduction, 35 VA. TAX REV. 327, 349 (2016) (showing that in 2009, $327 billion of the $598.1
billion spent on primary and secondary schools came from state government transfers).
65. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2010-004, TRENDS IN THE
USE OF SCHOOL CHOICE: 1993 TO 2007, at 7 (2010), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010004.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/H2UU-2JPD ] (finding that in 2007, seventy-three percent of public school students
attended their neighborhood school).
66. See, e.g., Rothwell, supra note 3, at 2–3.
67. See David Card, The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, in 3A HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 1801 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); Jian Huang, Henriëtte Maassen van
den Brink & Wim Groot, A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Education on Social Capital, 28
ECON. EDUC. REV. 454 (2009); David M. Cutler & Adriana Lleras-Muney, Education and
Health: Evaluating Theories and Evidence, in MAKING AMERICANS HEALTHIER: SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC POLICY AS HEALTH POLICY 29 (Robert F. Schoeni, James S. House, George A. Kaplan
& Harold Pollack eds., 2008); Justine S. Hastings & Jeffrey M. Weinstein, Information, School Choice,
and Academic Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1373 (2008) (finding that
students who won the lottery to higher-scoring schools performed significantly better than had they
not won the lottery for higher-scoring schools).
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income,68 wealthy neighborhoods typically have higher per pupil expenditures and
higher average test scores.69 Even though state governments generally ensure that
each school receives a baseline of funding, individual schools can receive more than
that baseline of funding through their local taxes. Therefore, wealthy localities,
which almost always have higher property taxes than poor localities, can afford to
exceed the baseline of funding and have better-funded schools than
poor localities.70
In addition to the fact that wealthy localities have higher taxes that result in
better-funded local amenities and services, wealthy localities may also have superior
amenities and services for nontax reasons. Because the residents of wealthy localities
usually have more political influence than those living in poorer localities, the
residents of wealthy localities typically have a disproportionate influence on the
distributions of both desirable (e.g., the location of county or state green spaces,
libraries, etc.) and undesirable public goods (e.g., landfills, prisons, etc.).71 As
Reardon and Bischoff put it, “Segregation of affluence not only concentrates
income and wealth in a small number of communities, but also concentrates social
capital and political power.”72 Therefore, wealthy localities often have better local
amenities and services for both tax revenue and political power reasons.
Turning to how the unequal distribution of resources negatively affects poor
localities, localities with lower median household incomes have lower property taxes
and therefore less funding for local services and amenities. The discrepancy in local
tax revenue between wealthy and poor localities is important because of the myriad

68. See Rothwell, supra note 3 (“We know school quality is highly correlated with neighborhood
income, and experimental evidence shows that poor children have higher cognitive scores and lifetime
earnings when they attend good schools. Interesting quasi-experimental evidence from the random
assignment of refugees shows that those who grow up in better neighborhoods do better at school.”).
69. See, e.g., Danielle Kurtzleben, Growing Up in a Poor Neighborhood Can Hold You Back in
Life — Even if Your Parents Aren’t Poor, VOX (Nov. 13, 2014, 10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/
2014/11/13/7210781/the-difference-between-growing-up-in-a-poor-vs-a-rich-neighborhood [ https://
web.archive.org/web/20141115163419/https://www.vox.com/2014/11/13/7210781/the-differencebetween-growing-up-in-a-poor-vs-a-rich-neighborhood ] (“[S]chool quality is highly correlated with
neighborhood income . . . .”); ROTHWELL, supra note 38 (reporting the standardized test scores for
high- and low-income students).
70. Scarsdale, New York, provides a well-known example of well-funded local public schools
and higher-than-average student test scores. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. Additional
amounts spent, both by schools and parents, on wealthy children may help explain the widening
achievement gap. See Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the Poor:
New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS,
AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 91 (2011); Kornrich, supra note 53, at 10 (noting that the increase in
spending by wealthy parents “might offer at least a partial explanation for changes in the income-based
achievement gap”).
71. LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE (2d ed. 2016); Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, How the Other Fifth Lives, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 27, 2016), https://nytimes.com/2016/04/27/opinion/campaign-stops/how-the-other-fifthlives.html [ https://perma.cc/BX4C-29PT ] (“Political leverage is another factor separating the top 20
percent from the rest of America.”).
72. See REARDON & BISCHOFF, supra note 1.
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ways in which local amenities, and especially schools, affect the outcomes of those
living in poor localities. Even though states use state tax revenue to subsidize poorer
school districts, on average, poor school districts receive about $1,000, or seven
percent, less per student than wealthy school districts.73 The gap between poor and
wealthy school districts widens to about $2,000, or sixteen percent, less per student
because it costs school districts more to educate poorer students, so schools in poor
localities face the double issue of less funding and higher costs.74 These differences
in resources add up, both in terms of total amounts spent and results achieved. For
example, living in a poor neighborhood is associated with attending schools that
have lower than average test scores, lower graduation rates, and reduced learning
outcomes.75 In contrast, moving to a lower-poverty neighborhood has a significant
positive effect on the socioeconomic perspective of young children.76 Poor localities
also typically have higher crime rates, less funding for police and fire departments,
lower quality health care facilities, fewer green spaces, and a dearth of other
resources that are beneficial for children’s development and upward mobility.77
Children who grow up in poor localities face a double disadvantage: not only
do they have access to fewer public resources, they also typically grow up in families
that do not have the private resources to compensate for the lack of public
resources. This lack of resources has harmful psychological effects on children and
other residents of poor localities,78 and it is very likely that the effects of living in

73. IVY MORGAN & ARY AMERIKANER, THE EDUC. TR., FUNDING GAPS: AN ANALYSIS OF
SCHOOL FUNDING EQUITY ACROSS THE U.S. AND WITHIN EACH STATE 6 (2018), https://
1k9gl1yevnfp2lpq1dhrqe17-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/FundingGapReport
_2018_FINAL.pdf [ https://perma.cc/P6TK-8F2E ].
74. See id. at 7; Thomas A. Downes & Thomas F. Pogue, Adjusting School Aid Formulas for the
Higher Cost of Educating Disadvantaged Students, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 89, 94–107 (1994) (finding that
disadvantaged students, including those who qualify for free or reduced price lunch, are more expensive
for a school to educate); William Duncombe & John Yinger, How Much More Does a Disadvantaged
Student Cost?, 24 ECON. EDUC. REV. 513 (2004) (developing models to price the increased cost of
educating disadvantaged students).
75. See Robert J. Sampson, Patrick Sharkey & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Durable Effects of
Concentrated Disadvantage on Verbal Ability Among African-American Children, 105 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCIS. 845 (2008), http://pnas.org/content/pnas/105/3/845.full.pdf [ https://perma.cc/2JB6PN94 ]; Geoffrey T. Wodtke, David J. Harding & Felix Elwert, Neighborhood Effects in Temporal
Perspective: The Impact of Long-Term Exposure to Concentrated Disadvantage on High School Graduation,
76 AM. SOCIO. REV. 713 (2011).
76. See Chetty et al., Effects of Exposure, supra note 59 (finding that neighborhood poverty
negatively affects children’s development and that moving to a lower-poverty neighborhood had
positive effects).
77. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2012); Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline & Emmanuel
Saez, Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States,
129 Q.J. ECON. 1553 (2014) (finding that the areas that provide more local public goods and larger tax
credits for low income families tend to have higher levels of upward mobility).
78. See Hirokazu Yoshikawa, J. Lawrence Aber & William R. Beardslee, The Effects of Poverty
on the Mental, Emotional, and Behavioral Health of Children and Youth Implications for Prevention, 67
AM. PSYCH. 272 (2012).
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localities with underfunded local schools, fewer green spaces, poorer homes, and so
on have adverse effects that cannot be easily expressed or measured.79
2. Distribution of Social Networks
Economic segregation affects the distribution of social networks in ways that
further amplify the benefits of being wealthy and the disadvantages of being poor.
People, and especially children, are strongly affected by older mentors who serve as
role models and provide information to the younger generation about educational
and employment opportunities.80 Since localities affect the composition of the
mentors in a social network, localities affect the distribution of these mentors.
People are also affected by their peers, and an individual’s peers are generally those
who live in the same locality. Mentor and peer group influences are significant
because they are understood to have imitative effects, meaning that people tend to
imitate the characteristics and behaviors of those with whom they spend time.
Social networks that include wealthy individuals benefit the wealthy, and in
particular, wealthy children. Children who grow up in wealthy localities associate
with mentors who generally have higher rates of employment, have a higher
percentage of graduate degrees, and who are more involved in the community.
Children in wealthy localities also associate with peers who have higher average test
scores, which matters because of the effects social networks have on classroom
composition and related effects.81 To the extent a child’s educational efforts and
achievements have effects on her friends and peers, then the locality she grows up
in affects her socioeconomic outcome. Studies have explored how children’s peers
affect their educational achievement and have shown a strong correlation between
a child’s educational achievement and the educational achievement of the child’s
peers.82 For example, higher average test scores of peers in the same grade has a

79. See Steven N. Durlauf, The Memberships Theory of Poverty: The Role of Group Affiliations in
Determining Socioeconomic Outcomes, in UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 392, 392 (Sheldon H. Danziger
& Robert H. Haveman eds., 2001).
80. Steven N. Durlauf, Neighborhood Effects, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN
ECONOMICS 2173, 2176–77 (J. Vernon Henderson & Jacques-François Thisse eds., 2004) (explaining
that imitative effects stem from a combination of psychological factors, including a desire to be like
others, interdependencies that cause certain information to be transmitted to others in the same social
circle, and interdependencies that result in certain behaviors having higher or lower opportunity costs).
81. See ROTHWELL, supra note 38, at 1 (“Nationwide, the average low-income student attends a
school that scores at the 42nd percentile on state exams, while the average middle/high-income student
attends a school that scores at the 61st percentile on state exams.”); Durlauf, supra note 79, at 393–94
(discussing the ways that the composition of an individual’s peers and mentors affect
socioeconomic outcomes).
82. See, e.g., Durlauf, supra note 80, at 2177 (“[T]he relative desirability of staying in school is
higher when adults in a community are college graduates or when one’s peers are also staying in
school.”); KIRK JOHNSON, THE HERITAGE FOUND., NO. CDA00-06, THE PEER EFFECT ON
ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AMONG PUBLIC ELEMENTARY SCHOOL STUDENTS 1 (2000), https://
www.heritage.org/education/report/the-peer-effect-academic-achievement-among-public-elementaryschool-students [ https://perma.cc/J544-LAM8 ] (concluding that peer effects are “a particularly strong
influence in academic achievement” and that “[t]he peer effect is independent of other factors such as
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positive effect on student performance.83 Wealthy localities also typically have more
community involvement, such as parent involvement in the classroom and
neighbors’ willingness to help children in the neighborhood, which also have a
positive effect on children’s long-term achievement.84
Does the fact that there are benefits from living in wealthy localities mean that
adding poor students to the mix (for example, through busing) negatively affects
the socioeconomic prospects of the wealthy students? There is not a clear consensus
in the literature,85 although it seems safe to conclude that it depends on how much
the composition of the wealthy school changes. As one scholar stated, “Does one
really think, for example, that adding two disadvantaged students to a school has
the same average effect . . . as replacing 20% of the students with disadvantaged
counterparts?”86 The answer is obviously no, although scholars and policymakers
have not determined the extent to which the different percentages affect schools or
whether the effects are incremental or a cliff.
Switching the focus from wealthy localities to poor localities, a social network
that is composed primarily of low-income households has negative effects,
particularly on children. The isolation of the wealthy and poor presents a
double-edged social problem. The isolation of the poor results in a lack of exposure
to middle-class and wealthy role models. Because the characteristics of both the
peers and mentors in children’s neighborhoods has an effect on their outcomes,87
this isolation contributes to social issues, higher rates of unemployment, and higher

race, ethnicity, gender, income, and other background variables.”); see also Vernon Henderson, Peter
Mieszkowski & Yvon Sauvageau, Peer Group Effects and Educational Production Functions, 10
J. PUB. ECON. 97, 105–06 (1978) (“It is quite unlikely that the parents of more able students will be
easily persuaded to sacrifice the achievement levels of their children in order to raise the performance
of less able students . . . .”).
83. Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain, Jacob M. Markman & Steven G. Rivkin, Does Peer Ability
Affect Student Achievement?, 18 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 527, 527 (2003) (showing that “peer
achievement has a positive effect on achievement growth” and that “students through the school test
score distribution appear to benefit from higher achieving schoolmates”).
84. See Robert J. Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Felton Earls, Beyond Social Capital: Spatial
Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for Children, 64 AM. SOCIO. REV. 633 (1999) (analyzing the data produced
by the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods and evaluating how neighborhood
members help one another); S. Wilder, Effects of Parental Involvement on Academic Achievement: A
Meta-Synthesis, 66 EDUC. REV. 377 (2014); Claire Cain Miller, Class Differences in Child-Rearing Are on the
Rise, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), https://nytimes.com/2015/12/18/upshot/rich-children-and-poorones-are-raised-very-differently.html [ https://perma.cc/4AUS-396X ].
85. Some studies have shown that sending children from poor schools to schools in more
affluent suburbs did not impact the test scores of the students who already attended the affluent
schools. E.g. Joshua D. Angrist & Kevin Lang, Does School Integration Generate Peer Effects? Evidence
from Boston’s Metco Program, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1613 (2004). However, as this Article has discussed,
the composition of one’s peers can affect socioeconomic outcomes. Thus, it seems that there must be
a tipping point at which integration of low-performing students would affect the high-performing
students, although the tipping point is likely difficult to impossible to measure.
86. Durlauf, supra note 79, at 414.
87. Watson, supra note 35, at 821.
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dependency on government assistance.88 The other edge of the sword comes from
the isolation of the wealthy; because high-income households do not interact with
low-income families, high-income households may be less inclined to directly or
indirectly (e.g., through voting for programs to assist low-income families) support
low-income families, which some speculate “may do as much harm to the poor as
the concentration of poverty itself.”89
3. Intergenerational Effects
Economic segregation itself perpetuates income inequality over time and
across multiple generations by allowing the wealthy to segregate their resources
from the poor, affecting the economic outcomes for both the children of wealthy
localities and the children of poor localities.90 Because economic segregation
amplifies the benefits of being wealthy and the disadvantages of being poor,
economic segregation is one of the reasons that one’s income status at birth is
strongly correlated to economic status in adulthood.91 Neighborhoods have a
substantial effect on children’s social mobility and play a significant role in

88. See WILSON, supra note 77, at 57 (“[I]n a neighborhood with a paucity of regularly employed
families and with the overwhelming majority of families having spells of long-term joblessness, people
experience a social isolation that excludes them from the job network system that permeates other
neighborhoods . . . . Thus, in such neighborhoods the chances are overwhelming that children will
seldom interact on a sustained basis with people who are employed . . . . A vicious cycle is perpetuated
through the family, through the community, and through the schools.”).
89. See REARDON & BISCHOFF, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that “it is increasingly unlikely that
high income families interact with middle and low income families, eroding some of the social
empathy that might lead to support for broader public investment in social programs to help the poor
and middle class”).
90. See Jonathan T. Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, Geographic Effects on Intergenerational Income
Mobility, 91 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 83 (2015) (analyzing the relationship between regional and
neighborhood conditions and intergenerational income mobility); Chetty et al., supra note 77 (exploring
factors that correlate with upward mobility, including economic segregation); LINDA LEVINE,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42400, THE U.S. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND MOBILITY: TRENDS AND
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 14 (2012), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42400.pdf (“[I]f the income
of a child’s parents was 30% higher than the average income of families in the parents’ generation, then
the child’s income will be 15% above the average for his/her generation. In other words, in the United
States, about 50% of the (dis)advantage of growing up in a (low) high income family may be inherited.”);
Daniel Aaronson & Bhashkar Mazumder, Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the United States, 1940
to 2000, 43 J. HUM. RES. 139 (2008); Bhashkar Mazumder, The Apple Falls Even Closer to the Tree than
We Thought: New and Revised Estimates of the Intergenerational Inheritance of Earnings, in UNEQUAL
CHANCES: FAMILY BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS 80 (Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
& Melissa Osborne Groves eds., 2005); Russell W. Rumberger, Education and the Reproduction of
Economic Inequality in the United States: An Empirical Investigation, 29 ECON. EDUC. REV. 246 (2010).
91. See Durlauf, supra note 49, at 75 (“Economic stratification combines with strong
neighborhoodwide feedback effects to transmit economic status across generations, leading to
persistent income inequality.”); Chetty et al., Effects of Exposure, supra note 59, at 855 (finding that there
were significant advantages for young children who moved to lower-poverty neighborhoods, but that
moving to lower-poverty neighborhoods had little effect on adults’ economic outcomes).

First to Printer _Shobe.docx (Do Not Delete)

560

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

11/30/20 9:10 PM

[Vol. 11:539

children’s future earning potential.92 In fact, every year of childhood spent in either
a wealthy or poor neighborhood affects children’s social mobility.93 Although
wealthy parents pass their wealth on to their children in other ways,94 their choice
to raise their children in wealthy neighborhoods should interest scholars and
policymakers because Congress has the power to reduce the incentives for the
wealthy to segregate into wealthy neighborhoods through sensible tax policy, as
discussed later in this Article.95 Doing so could reduce economic segregation and
therefore increase intergenerational economic mobility.
Conversely, raising children in poor localities perpetuates the poverty cycle.
Intergenerational income immobility—the extent to which income levels can
change across multiple generations—is a persistent issue for those living in poor
localities and policymakers hoping to effect change in those localities.96
Neighborhoods with low median household incomes typically have a low
percentage of college graduates, local public schools that receive the minimum
baseline of funding, and higher crime. Children who grow up in these types of
neighborhoods are less likely to interact with mentors who could teach them skills,
provide them with information about neighborhood options, and inform them of
educational paths and job opportunities.97 Due to unequal distribution of local
resources and social networks, both the high and low college attendance rates of the
92. See Rothwell & Massey, supra note 90, at 96 (concluding that people in the bottom income
quartile would have had a $500,000 higher lifetime household income if they had been raised in a top
quartile neighborhood).
93. See David Leonhardt, Amanda Cox & Claire Cain Miller, An Atlas of Upward Mobility Shows
Paths Out of Poverty, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (May 4, 2015), https://nytimes.com/2015/05/04/
upshot/an-atlas-of-upward-mobility-shows-paths-out-of-poverty.html
[ https://perma.cc/H5BW6P4R ] (“Every extra year of childhood spent in a better neighborhood seems to matter.”).
94. Some of the other ways that wealthy parents give their children a leg up include providing
them healthy lifestyles, directly passing on monetary wealth, and spending time with them. See STEVEN
H. WOOLF, LAUDAN ARON, LISA DUBAY, SARAH H. SIMON, EMILY ZIMMERMAN & KIM X. LUK,
URB. INST., HOW ARE INCOME AND WEALTH LINKED TO HEALTH AND LONGEVITY? 1 (2015),
https://urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/49116/2000178-How-are-Income-and-WealthLinked-to-Health-and-Longevity.pdf [ https://perma.cc/W39B-ZR9W ] (discussing the relationship
between income and why “Americans at all income levels are less healthy than those with incomes
higher than their own”); Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Inheritance of Inequality, 16
J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 18 (2002) (discussing how parents pass money on to their children); Garey Ramey
& Valerie A. Ramey, The Rug Rat Race, 41 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 129, 129 (2010)
(modeling the ways that college-educated parents spend more time than non-college educated parents
to help their children compete for college admissions); Jonathan Guryan, Erik Hurst & Melissa Kearney,
Parental Education and Parental Time with Children, 22 J. ECON. PERSPS. 23, 44 (2008) (finding that
parents with higher earnings spend more time with their children and noting that “the fact that they do
so may have important implications for the intergenerational transmission of human capital”); id. at 23
(showing that college educated mothers spend approximately 4.5 more hours per week with their
children than non-college educated mothers).
95. See infra Part III.
96. See, e.g., Ann Owens & Susan Clampet-Lundquist, Housing Mobility and the Intergenerational
Durability of Neighborhood Poverty, 39 J. URB. AFFS. 400, 401–02 (2017); Gary Solon, Intergenerational
Income Mobility in the United States, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1992).
97. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 77; Owens & Clampet-Lundquist, supra note 96 (examining the
many ways that neighborhood poverty continues from one generation to the next).
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mentors in the communities will influence the college attendance rates and
economic prospects of the children in the respective communities.98 “One way to
think about the poverty trap is that a community, if initially comprised of poor
members, will remain poor across long time periods, even generations.”99
II. SUBSIDIZING ECONOMIC SEGREGATION THROUGH THE LOCAL TAX
DEDUCTION
This Part explores the relationship between economic segregation and the
local tax deduction and argues that the local tax deduction has contributed to the
rise in economic segregation, or at least has rewarded it. It first explains why only
the relatively wealthy claim the deduction. It then describes how the deduction acts
as a subsidy from the federal government to localities because it allows localities to
charge higher taxes than they could in the absence of the deduction. It then asks a
question that has gone unaddressed in the literature: Which localities does the local
tax deduction subsidize? The answer is intuitive, important, and relevant to
economic segregation, and supported by recent anecdotal and empirical evidence of
the effects of tax reform.100 This Part shows that the local tax deduction
disproportionately subsidizes wealthy localities because only the relatively wealthy
benefit from the deduction on their tax return. Therefore, only localities with a
critical mass of relatively wealthy taxpayers can charge higher taxes (at the expense
of the federal government) as a result of the deduction.101 To the extent wealthy
localities are economically homogenous (i.e., exclude the poor), and to the extent
states do not force redistribution among localities, wealthy taxpayers are able to
minimize redistribution of this subsidy to the poor. Therefore, the deduction
certainly rewards and likely contributes to economic segregation, which, as
established in Part I, has perverse effects on lower-income households, especially
for the children in those households.
A. The Two Benefits Created by the State and Local Tax Deduction
The state and local tax deduction benefits taxpayers in two distinct ways. First,
it allows itemizing taxpayers to reduce their federal tax liability on their federal tax
return. Second, it acts as a subsidy for states and localities. Stated differently, the first

98. See Durlauf, supra note 80, at 2177.
99. Id. “Another definition of the poverty trap is a socially undesirable (in the sense of
producing poverty across a community) collection of behaviors in which the behaviors are mutually
reinforcing and so individually rational.” Id. at 2178.
100. The recent $10,000 cap on the state and local tax deduction has reduced housing prices in
wealthy neighborhoods but not in poor neighborhoods, indicating that the deduction acts as a subsidy
primarily for wealthy neighborhoods. See Tankersley, supra note 26 (“In the top 10 percent of areas that
make use of the SALT deduction, growth in home values have slowed by about 0.6 percentage points
since the law took effect. At the median, growth has slowed by about 0.3 percentage points. The bottom
10 percent haven’t seen any slowdown.”); see also supra notes 21–25 and accompanying notes (discussing
anecdotal evidence of the connection between economic segregation and the deduction).
101. See infra note 116 (discussing what constitutes a “critical mass” for purposes of this Article).
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benefit is a “pay less in taxes” direct benefit for itemizing taxpayers while the second
benefit is a “get more government services at a discount” indirect benefit. These
two benefits are well understood, but the relationship between them and their effect
on economic segregation has not been explored in the literature.
1. The Deduction Reduces Taxes for the Wealthy
The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) generally allows taxpayers to reduce
their federal taxable income by amounts they pay in state and local taxes. However,
this deduction is taken only by taxpayers who choose to itemize their deductions
(i.e., reduce their taxable income by actual deductions) rather than take the standard
deduction (i.e., reduce their taxable income by a set amount).102 Because taxpayers
only itemize their deductions, including the state and local tax deduction, when the
total amount of their itemized deductions exceeds the standard deduction, only
taxpayers who itemize get any benefit from the deduction on their tax return.
Unsurprisingly, the upper-middle class and the wealthy itemize at much higher
rates than less wealthy taxpayers. Before the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA),
the details and effects of which are discussed in Part III, approximately thirty
percent of taxpayers itemized their tax deductions.103 More specifically, before the
TCJA, ninety-two percent of households with adjusted gross incomes over $500,000
itemized, forty-six percent of households with adjusted gross incomes between
$50,000 and $99,000 itemized, and only seven percent of households with adjusted
gross incomes under $30,000 itemized.104 These statistics show that before the
TCJA, the upper-middle class and the wealthy were able to claim the deduction at a
much higher rate than the relatively less wealthy. The TCJA doubled the standard
deduction, which reduced the number of taxpayers who itemize to approximately
twelve percent in 2018.105 Starting in 2018, the percentage of middle-class taxpayers
who claim the deduction dropped significantly because only the relatively wealthy

102. 26 U.S.C. § 161. Both the standard and itemized deductions reduce a taxpayer’s overall tax
liability. The standard deduction is a preset deduction based on a taxpayer’s taxable income, whereas
the itemized deduction includes many individual deductions. The vast majority of taxpayers who itemize
their tax deductions include the state and local tax deduction as one of their deductions. Examples of
individual deductions, other than state and local tax, include home mortgage interest, medical expenses,
and charitable contributions. See CHENXI LU, TAX POL’Y CTR., ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS (2017), http:/
/www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/87831/2001128-itemized-deductions.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/W67J-PQVF ].
103. Because this Part focuses primarily on how the tax system has influenced economic
segregation, the pre-TCJA law is more relevant to this Part than the new law. For further discussion of
how tax reform affected the state and local tax deduction, see infra Part III. See also LU, supra note 102,
at 3.
104. See LU, supra note 102, at 1–2.
105. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-32R-18, TABLES RELATED TO THE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT 2017 THROUGH 2026 (2018). The 2017 tax reform also changed
how the deduction works. Prior to 2018 (and starting again in 2025), taxpayers who itemized could fully
deduct their state and local taxes, while under current law, taxpayers who itemize can to deduct up to
$10,000 of their state and local taxes. See infra Part III.
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earn enough to itemize their deductions under the new law.106 Relatively wealthy
taxpayers benefited from the state and local tax deduction at a higher rate than the
middle class and the poor, and tax reform further skewed the demographics of
taxpayers who claim the deduction toward the wealthiest taxpayers. Furthermore,
even among those who do itemize, the deduction is worth more to the wealthiest
of those taxpayers because an itemized deduction is worth as much as a taxpayer’s
marginal income tax rate.107
2. The Deduction is a Federal Subsidy for State and Local Governments
The state and local tax deduction also benefits taxpayers because it acts as a
subsidy from the federal government to states and localities, which can pass that
subsidy along to their residents. The deduction acts as a subsidy because it allows
states and localities to charge higher tax rates than they could absent the deduction
by reducing the cost of state and local taxes to taxpayers: for every dollar an
itemizing taxpayer pays, she gets to reduce her federal tax liability by a portion of
that dollar, which is effectively the same as the locality charging a lower tax rate.108
This discount on state and local taxes increases taxpayers’ tolerance for those taxes,
and therefore states and localities can charge higher tax rates as a result of the state
and local tax deduction.109 In other words, the deduction acts as a subsidy from the
federal government to states and localities because the deduction reduces the
amount of federal taxes an individual pays while increasing the amount of state and
local taxes that states and localities can charge.
Because the local tax deduction allows states and localities to charge higher
taxes, it enables them to collect more revenue than they would without the
deduction. To the extent states and localities use the additional revenue to provide
more or higher-quality goods and services, the deduction allows states and localities
to provide more goods and services than they could in the absence of the deduction.

106. See infra Part III.
107. Some of the wealthiest taxpayers will be subject to the alternative minimum tax credit
(AMT) because the state and local tax deduction is not deductible to the extent taxpayers are subject to
the AMT. However, the 2017 tax reform scaled back the AMT so that it applies to far fewer taxpayers.
H.R. REP. NO. 115-409, at 45–48 (2017) (Conf. Rep.).
108. This rationale presupposes that states and localities are able to raise their rates because
itemizing taxpayers are aware that the deduction reduces their federal tax liability. See Gilbert E. Metcalf,
Assessing the Federal Deduction for State and Local Tax Payments, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 565, 565–90 (2011)
(finding that states and localities charge higher tax rates in response to the state and local tax deduction).
109. Some states impose property tax limits on their localities. See Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Tax
Limits and the Future of Local Democracy, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1884, 1893 (2020). An interesting project
would be to examine states that impose local property tax limitations to analyze whether wealthy
localities charge up to the state limit more often than poorer localities.
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B. Geographic and Demographic Distribution of the Deduction’s Subsidy
The two benefits created by the state and local tax deduction have been the
source of policy arguments both for and against the deduction.110 Scholars have
defended the deduction by arguing that the deduction subsidizes state and local
goods that benefit the broader population, including the poor.111 This Section
pushes back on that argument by separately analyzing the federal deduction for state
taxes and the federal deduction for taxes paid to “localities” (any substate taxing
jurisdiction, such as cities, counties, towns, and special taxing jurisdictions), which
this Article will refer to respectively as the “state tax deduction” and the “local tax
deduction.”112 This Section argues that the subsidy created by the local tax deduction
disproportionately subsidizes wealthy, economically segregated localities, which is
significant because the state and local tax deduction, one of the largest tax
expenditures, cost the federal government approximately $100.9 billion in 2017
alone,113 approximately half of which was for local taxes.114
1. The “Local Tax Deduction”: A Subsidy for Wealthy Localities
In order to understand how the deduction rewards economic segregation, it is
essential first to ask where, demographically and geographically, the deduction’s
subsidy for state and local governments flows. This Section answers that question
in terms of the local tax deduction by analyzing (i) which types of localities the local
tax deduction subsidizes and (ii) whether those localities are able to capture that
subsidy for their residents, or whether they are required to share it with others
through redistribution.
The local tax deduction disproportionately subsidizes wealthy localities.
Explaining this new and important insight requires building on the information
explained above—that the deduction acts as a subsidy because when itemizing
taxpayers effectively get a discount on their local taxes, they tolerate a higher tax
110. See infra Part III.
111. See infra notes 134–35.
112. The Author’s prior work disaggregated the federal deduction for state taxes and the federal
deduction for local taxes and separately analyzed whether either is justified from a tax policy
perspective. It argued that there is a stronger relationship between local taxes paid and local benefits
received than there is between state taxes paid and state benefits received, and that because of the
comparatively close relationship between local taxes paid and benefits received, the exchange of local
taxes and benefits looks more like consumption and therefore a deduction is less justified for local
taxes than it is for state taxes. However, that work treated all localities the same and stopped short of
examining which types of localities benefit from the deduction and how the local tax deduction
subsidizes economic segregation. See Shobe, supra note 64, at 334; Gladriel Shobe, Opinion, The GOP
Gets a Big Part of Its Tax Plan Backward, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-gop-gets-a-big-part-of-its-tax-plan-backward/2017/11/07/
63a7ad1e-c3f4-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_story.html [ https://perma.cc/M3K3-NABQ ].
113. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
114. See Gladriel Shobe, Ending the Local Tax Deduction, 149 TAX NOTES FED. 955, 955–56
(2015) (estimating the local portion of the state and local deduction based on the Joint Committee on
Taxation’s estimates of tax expenditures combined with Census Bureau statistics, which separately
indicates the percentage of each expenditure that comes from states and localities).
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rate than they would in the absence of a deduction—and then taking that
information a step further to show that only certain localities can raise their tax rates
as a result of the deduction.115 Importantly and intuitively, because only the
relatively wealthy itemize their local taxes, only localities with a critical mass of
relatively wealthy taxpayers can charge higher taxes as a result of the deduction.116
Stated differently, poor taxpayers rarely itemize their local taxes,117 so localities that
are comprised primarily of poor residents receive little to no benefit from the
deduction because those localities do not have a federal subsidy that allows them to
charge local taxes at a discounted rate. Of course, the majority of localities are
neither all wealthy nor all poor, so the extent to which any particular locality is
subsidized by the local tax deduction will depend on that locality’s unique
circumstances. However, the local tax deduction clearly subsidizes wealthy localities
far more frequently than it subsidizes poor localities, and therefore it
disproportionately subsidizes wealthy localities’ already superior local schools,
parks, police departments, and so on, all at the expense of the nation as a whole.118
The local tax deduction’s subsidy for wealthy localities would not be
problematic from a tax policy perspective if the local goods and services purchased
with that subsidy were redistributive.119 However, to the extent wealthy taxpayers
“get what they pay for” when they pay local taxes, the exchange of local taxes for
local goods and services looks like “consumption,” for which it is generally

115. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
116. What constitutes a “critical mass” of wealthy, itemizing taxpayers depends on the
percentage of households in a locality that are wealthy enough to claim the deduction and several other
factors. If only one out of every 100 households in a locality claimed the deduction, then the deduction
would be unlikely to act as a subsidy to that locality because the locality would be unlikely to be able to
charge higher taxes to all 100 residents in light of the deduction being applicable only to one resident.
However, if ninety-nine out of every 100 households in a locality claimed the deduction, then the locality
would be much more likely to be able to raise its tax rates (and therefore generate additional tax revenue)
because those taxes would be cheaper than face value to those ninety-nine residents. Of course many
localities are comprised of a mix of both wealthy and poor residents, and whether and how much those
localities can raise their taxes as a result of the local tax deduction would depend on other factors,
including the residents’ various income levels, effective tax rates, political influence, and desire for
various local goods and services. But what is clear is that a locality with all itemizing taxpayers, which
is inherently a wealthy locality, should tolerate a higher local tax rate than a locality with no itemizing
taxpayers, which is inherently a poor locality.
117. See LU, supra note 102.
118. Tax scholars have made related arguments that when the federal government subsidizes
states and localities, that subsidization results in an “oversupply” of state and local public goods and
services. See Kaplow, supra note 9, at 487–90.
119. Many favor a federal deduction for state and local taxes when the relationship between
taxes paid and benefits received is too attenuated to view the exchange as consumption and the revenue
generated by the taxes benefits the broader population. See Galle, supra note 9, at 813; Kaplow, supra
note 9, at 417; Charles R. Hulten & Robert M. Schwab, A Haig-Simons-Tiebout Comprehensive Income
Tax, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 67, 68–71 (1991); Brookes D. Billman, Jr. & Noel B. Cunningham, Nonbusiness
State and Local Taxes: The Case for Deductibility, 28 TAX NOTES FED. 1107, 1111–12 (1985). The
federal tax deduction for charitable donations operates under a similar rationale: when taxpayers donate
amounts to a Section 501(c)(3) organization, their deduction is reduced to the extent they receive a
benefit in return.
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acknowledged taxpayers should not get a deduction.120 On the other hand, to the
extent wealthy taxpayers fund local goods and services for poorer taxpayers, the
local tax deduction redistributes benefits from the wealthy to the poor, for which a
deduction is generally supported (much like with a charitable donation).121
Therefore, whether taxpayers should receive a deduction for their local taxes turns
on whether there is a close relationship between local taxes paid and local goods
and services received or whether there is redistribution from the wealthy to
the poor.
One factor in determining the closeness of the relationship between local taxes
paid and local goods and services received, and therefore whether a deduction is
justified, is whether the locality is economically homogenous. Because there are a
multitude of taxing jurisdictions with their own unique demographic composition,
this Section evaluates localities on a spectrum of economic homogeneity. At one
end of the spectrum are wealthy, economically homogenous localities, and at the
other are economically heterogeneous localities.122 In between are a wide range of
possible distributions, although typically, the smaller the locality, the more likely it
is to fall on the economically homogenous end of the spectrum, and the larger the
locality, the more likely it is to fall on the economically heterogeneous end of
the spectrum.
In localities on the economically homogenous end of the spectrum, there is a
close relationship between local taxes paid and local goods and services received.
One well-known example of a wealthy, economically homogenous locality is
Scarsdale, New York.123 Although people are well aware that Scarsdale is comprised

120. Under the Haig-Simons definition of taxable income—consumption plus
savings—taxpayers should not receive a deduction for consumption, including purchases of public
goods and services. Therefore, if the individuals who pay taxes are not the ones who receive the benefits
funded by the taxes, then there is no exchange of taxes for benefits. In that case, there is no
consumption and the tax paying individuals should be permitted to deduct the taxes. See HENRY
C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL
POLICY (1938); Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in READINGS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959).
121. Scholars and policymakers generally agree that the marginal utility of public goods and
services to the poor exceeds the marginal utility to the wealthy and that because the wealthy have a
greater ability to pay, they should fund a higher percentage of public goods and services. Therefore, the
tax code should be at least somewhat progressive. For further discussion of the duties of the wealthy
to help the poor, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Amartya Sen, On Weights and
Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis, 45 ECONOMETRICA 1539 (1977); Louis
Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism, 48 NAT’L TAX
J. 497 (1995).
122. Although it is also true that there is a close relationship between taxes paid and benefits
received in poor, economically homogenous localities, those localities are not a focus of this Section
because they receive little to no direct subsidy from the local tax deduction.
123. Elsa Brenner, Houses Even Bigger, Scores Way Above Average, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2008),
https://nytimes.com/2008/05/18/realestate/18livi.html
[ https://perma.cc/6UX3-QAZB ]
(discussing the well-funded and high-quality Scarsdale schools and the high Scarsdale property taxes);
David McKay Wilson, Scarsdale Revaluation Hits High-End Homes Hardest, LOHUD (Aug. 4, 2014,
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primarily of wealthy residents and has excellent local goods and services, including
exceptional local public schools, what has been generally overlooked is the fact that
because Scarsdale is economically segregated and wealthy, its local schools are
subsidized by the local tax deduction in ways that poor and economically
heterogeneous local schools are not. Importantly, the primary reason that Scarsdale
is economically homogenous, and therefore able to capture the local tax deduction’s
subsidy for its wealthy residents, is that its local taxing jurisdiction is small
(essentially the town of Scarsdale itself). If Scarsdale were part of a larger substate
taxing jurisdiction that included poor, neighboring areas, then the wealthy residents
of Scarsdale would have to share their local tax revenue with poorer taxpayers and
the relationship between local taxes paid and local benefits received would be more
attenuated for the wealthy Scarsdale residents.124 Even though most localities are
not as wealthy and economically homogenous as Scarsdale, wealthy, economically
homogeneous localities have become increasingly more common in recent years.125
On the other end of the spectrum lie economically heterogeneous localities,
for which the relationship between local taxes paid and local benefits received is
attenuated and for which a deduction for local taxes is therefore justified from a tax
policy perspective. The larger a locality is, both in terms of size and population, the
more likely it is to be economically heterogeneous and therefore redistributive.126
Two examples of economically heterogeneous localities include Los Angeles
County (LA) and New York City. Because LA and New York City each have a
significant number of wealthy, middle-class, and poor taxpayers, benefits are
redistributed from the wealthy, who fund a disproportionate share of the local tax

10:41 AM), https://lohud.com/story/money/personal-finance/taxes/david-mckay-wilson/2014/
08/02/scarsdale-wealthy-homeowners-rattled-revaluation/13532461/
[ https://perma.cc/YMF5FLG4 ] (discussing Scarsdale’s high property taxes and stating that Scarsdale has “one of the nation’s
finest school districts”).
124. See
Fault
Lines,
EDBUILD,
http://viz.edbuild.org/maps/2016/fault-lines/
[ https://perma.cc/QVQ3-HVC4 ] ( last visited Nov. 23, 2020 ) (“Because property taxes play such an
important role in school funding, well-off communities have an interest in school district borders that
fence off their own neighborhoods from lower-wealth areas and needier students—and most states’
laws allow this kind of self-segregation.”); Fractured: The Breakdown of America’s School Districts,
EDBUILD, https://staging.edbuild.org/content/fractured-2017#intro [ https://perma.cc/6ZQQS2ZV ] ( last visited Nov. 23, 2020 ) (“When lenient secession policies are combined with funding
systems rooted in local property taxes, it creates a structure in which communities are incentivized to
close themselves off—one in which the better-off are rewarded for lesser participation, often without
consideration for either the efficiency of the system or for the welfare of the children left behind.”).
125. See supra Part I.
126. See, e.g., CHINGOS & BLAGG, supra note 64 (“Florida and New York represent different
ends of the spectrum. . . . New York has many school districts, most of which are relatively small, and
Florida has 67 countywide districts (e.g., the entire Miami metropolitan area is a single district). . . . New
York school districts are segregated by income, whereas Florida districts—mostly because of their
size—are much more integrated. In New York, the average poor student attends school districts with
poverty rates that are 40 percent higher than those nonpoor students attend. In Florida, the difference
is only 6 percent.”). For further discussion of ways in which localities are redistributive, see Clayton
P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1060–65 (2007) (describing local redistributive programs in the United States).
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revenue, to those who receive those localities’ local goods and services, which
include taxpayers from all income levels.
Another factor in determining the closeness of the relationship between local
taxes paid and local goods and services received is whether the state in which the
locality is located forces redistribution among that state’s localities. In contrast to
the type of redistribution described immediately above, which occurs within
localities due to economic heterogeneity, this type of redistribution occurs among
localities. To the extent a state forces wealthier localities to share their tax revenue
with poorer localities, a deduction for those taxes is justified because the taxes paid
by the residents of the wealthy localities are then redistributive (and not
consumption). Because most local tax revenue funds the types of benefits that are
consumed primarily by those living within the locality, such as elementary and
secondary education, police and fire protection, and parks and recreation, without
state intervention, there is unlikely to be any significant redistribution from one
locality to another.127 In particular, without state intervention, poor school districts
would receive significantly less funding than wealthy school districts. Therefore,
many states redistribute funding from wealthy to poor school districts, although
whether poor school districts receive as much funding as wealthy localities varies
significantly from state to state.128 Across the United States, poor school districts
spend about $1,000, or seven percent, less per student than wealthy school
districts.129 The funding gap widens to $2,000, or sixteen percent, after adjusting for
the additional costs associated with educating low-income students.130
127. REARDON & BISCHOFF, supra note 1, at 14 (“[A]ny self-interested investment the rich
make in their own communities has little chance of ‘spilling over’ to benefit middle- and low-income
families.”). A minimal amount of redistribution may occur naturally among localities (without state
intervention) when, for example, a taxpayer from one locality uses the local park of another locality.
Natural redistribution from one locality to another is often referred to as “spillovers.” See Richard
Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115,
1132–33 (1996) (discussing local governments and spillovers); see also Annual Survey of State and Local
Government Finances, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/govfinances.html [ https://perma.cc/P8XY-G7TJ ] ( last visited Oct. 12, 2020 ) (compiling annual datasets
that show how localities spend their tax revenue).
128. See CHINGOS & BLAGG, supra note 64, at 1–2 (“Redistributing funding across districts is a
natural role for states to play, as they have the capacity to collect taxes statewide and then apportion
funding among local districts. . . . Currently, 35 states have a provision in their formula that provides
additional funding to districts serving more low-income students. In theory, these provisions should
make school funding more progressive by spending more money on students from low-income families.
But this depends on how successful are states at counteracting local funding, which tends to be
regressive.”); Ivy Morgan & Ary Amerikaner, Funding Gaps 2018: An Analysis of School Funding Equity
Across the U.S. and Within Each State, EDUC. TR. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://edtrust.org/resource/
funding-gaps-2018/ [ https://perma.cc/S5VT-CS5Y ] (“There is, of course, great variation among
states’ school funding patterns. Nebraska stands out for its unfairness, spending nearly 25 percent less
per pupil in districts serving the most students of color. And while in 14 states, districts that serve the
most students of color receive substantially more money, in 14 other states, they receive substantially
less.”); see also EDBUILD, supra note 124 (providing interactive tools that show how each state funds its
local schools and explaining the cost-sharing agreements states have with their local school districts).
129. MORGAN & AMERIKANER, supra note 73.
130. Id.

First to Printer _Shobe.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

11/30/20 9:10 PM

SUBSIDIZING ECONOMIC SEGREGATION

569

In sum, the local tax deduction disproportionately subsidizes wealthy localities
(which have a critical mass of wealthy, itemizing taxpayers), and wealthy taxpayers
who live in those wealthy, economically segregated localities can keep that subsidy
for themselves due to minimal redistribution within economically homogenous
localities. Therefore, unless a state forces redistribution among its localities, taxes
paid to wealthy, economically homogenous localities resemble consumption due to
the close relationship between taxes paid and benefits received. However, the local
deduction benefits the wealthy who live in large, economically heterogeneous
localities much less because more of their taxes are redistributed, and therefore a
deduction for their local taxes is generally merited. In between are a number of more
or less economically homogenous localities, for which a deduction is more or less
justified depending on a particular locality’s makeup. Because the wealthy often and
increasingly live in exclusive, wealthy localities, the local tax deduction
disproportionately and increasingly benefits wealthy localities and those who live
in them.131
2. The “State Tax Deduction”: Broad Distribution of Benefits
The state tax deduction is not the focus of this Article, but it provides a useful
comparison point to the local tax deduction. Like the local tax deduction, the state
tax deduction enables states to charge higher state taxes because it discounts state
tax rates for itemizing taxpayers.132 However, the state tax deduction is less
controversial from a tax policy perspective because states are naturally economically
heterogeneous due to their size, making it impossible for taxpayers to economically
segregate at the state level. Therefore, when taxpayers pay state taxes, the benefits
funded by those taxes broadly benefit all taxpayers in the state, including the
poor.133 Because state taxes are redistributive and the relationship between state
taxes paid and state benefits received is attenuated, a deduction for state taxes is
more justified from a tax policy perspective, which dictates that taxpayers should
get a deduction when there is little to no relationship between taxes paid and
benefits received.134 Large local taxing jurisdictions like LA and New York City

131. An interesting project would be to create a map that geographically showed which
households claimed the deduction. The map would illustrate how those who claim the deduction are
tightly clustered in wealthy localities.
132. It also seems probable that states with higher concentrations of wealthy, itemizing
taxpayers would be more likely to raise their tax rates as a result of the state tax deduction.
133. State taxes are relatively redistributive in nature because state taxes, which are paid
primarily by wealthier taxpayers, disproportionately fund state goods and services that are for the
benefit of the poor, such as funding poor school districts, state welfare programs, and healthcare for
low-income residents. See Shobe, supra note 64, at 347–51; Annual Survey of State and Local Government
Finances, supra note 127.
134. Scholars and policymakers generally support tax deductions for redistributive taxes
because deductibility makes those who pay the taxes (but are not the beneficiaries of the public goods
and services purchased by the taxes) less opposed to such taxes. See Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer,
I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66
TAX L. REV. 179, 180, 200, 212 (2013); Howard Chernick, A Model of the Distributional Incidence of
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function more like states in this way, justifying a deduction for residents of
those localities.
C. The Local Tax Deduction Rewards and Contributes to Economic Segregation
Does the state and local tax deduction reward economic segregation? If so, is
the deduction a contributing factor to the rise in economic segregation among
households with children? This Section argues that the answer to each of those
questions is yes.
Economic segregation rewards the wealthy in two ways, the first of which is
independent of the local tax deduction. This first reward exists because when the
wealthy segregate into wealthy-only localities, they do not need to subsidize local
goods and services for the less wealthy (and therefore they are more likely to “get
what they pay for” in terms of local taxes).135 Because economic segregation rewards
wealthy taxpayers by allowing them to fund superior local goods and services
without having to subsidize those goods and services for the less wealthy, there is
an incentive for them to segregate from the poor that is independent of federal
income tax considerations.136 As economists have noted, “Wealthy families have an
incentive to isolate themselves from the rest of the economy in order to provide the
highest level of education for their children at the lowest cost.”137
The local tax deduction creates a second reward for the wealthy to
economically segregate from the poor by allowing the wealthy to receive more than
what they pay in local taxes when they economically segregate, because, as discussed
above, the local tax deduction disproportionately subsidizes wealthy, economically
homogeneous localities.138 When wealthy taxpayers choose to live in economically
heterogeneous localities, they can still get the benefit of reducing their tax liability
by itemizing their local taxes, but they lose the two rewards that come with

State and Local Taxes, 20 PUB. FIN. Q. 572 (1992) (demonstrating that deductibility of state and local
taxes increases the progressivity of state and local tax systems); Stark, supra note 10, at 1425 (“The
overall effect of current law, therefore, is that the . . . state and local tax systems have been made more
progressive (because of the incentive to shift the state and local tax burdens to high-income
tax taxpayers).”)
135. See Durlauf, supra note 49, at 75 (stating that the benefits of superior local public schools
plus the sociological effects connected with living in wealthy neighborhoods has created “incentives for
wealthier families to segregate themselves into economically homogeneous neighborhoods”).
136. To illustrate, consider two localities, A and B, with very different economic compositions.
Assume that locality A is composed half of wealthy residents who each paid $10,000 in local taxes and
half poor residents who paid no local taxes. Assuming that locality A spent the same amount of local
tax revenue on each resident, the resources purchased with the local taxes would be evenly distributed
among the wealthy and poor residents, and the wealthy residents would receive only $5,000 of the
benefit of the local taxes they paid to locality A. In contrast, locality B is composed entirely of wealthy
residents who each paid $10,000 in local taxes. Assuming that locality B spent the same amount of local
tax revenue on each resident, then each resident would receive $10,000 in local benefits. In other words,
locality A redistributed tax revenue from the wealthy to the poor, but locality B did not because it was
economically homogenous.
137. Durlauf, supra note 49, at 90.
138. See supra Section II.B.1.
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economic segregation. There is a corresponding economic incentive for the poor to
live in predominately wealthy localities because doing so would give them access to
local goods and services that are subsidized by higher local taxes paid by the wealthy.
However, due to zoning restrictions, the poor are typically priced out of wealthy
localities and are therefore restricted in their ability to move into such localities.139
By rewarding taxpayers for economic segregation, the local tax deduction
creates an incentive for taxpayers to economically segregate and has therefore likely
contributed to economic segregation. Many factors go into the complicated
calculation of where to live, and the quality of local goods and services, and
especially the quality of local schools compared to their cost, goes into that
calculation.140 Because the local tax deduction allows relatively wealthy localities to
provide better goods and services at a cheaper cost than they could in the absence
of the deduction, the deduction changes the cost-benefit analysis in favor of those
localities for those who can afford to choose to live there. To illustrate, if the
deduction’s federal subsidy allowed a wealthy locality to hire additional teachers and
build better schools than an adjacent, less wealthy locality, and the quality of local
schools was the deciding factor that caused a wealthy taxpayer to choose the wealthy
locality over the less wealthy locality that did not benefit from the deduction, then
the deduction contributed to that taxpayer’s decision to economically segregate.141
Of course, the first reward to economically segregate (the nontax benefit of low
redistribution) also changes the cost-benefit analysis in favor of the wealthy locality.
However, if the local tax deduction’s additional reward to economically segregate
139. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 218
(2001). Although government subsidized housing and housing vouchers could, in theory, ameliorate
the issue, these housing policies have proven to be relatively ineffective at moving low-income
households into wealthier localities. See, e.g., Michelle D. Layser, How Federal Tax Law Rewards Housing
Segregation, 93 IND. L.J. 915, 919 (2018) (arguing that “the federal tax law discourages integration
through the low-income housing tax credit program and rewards White-flight and economic
segregation through the mortgage interest deduction,” which exacerbates “the enduring effects of past
policies like redlining and exclusionary zoning, while also limiting the effectiveness of nontax federal
programs intended to promote housing choice, such as the Section 8 tenant voucher program”).
140. See Owens, Inequality in Children’s Contexts, supra note 1, at 565–67.
141. The fact that many wealthy families choose to send their children to private school does
not affect this Section’s arguments. Typically, parents send their children to private school either for
religious reasons, which are not particularly relevant to this Article, or because they live in a large
metropolitan area with low-performing public schools. Jacob Davidson, You’ll Never Guess the City
Where Private School Is the Most Common, MONEY (Aug. 14, 2014), https://money.com/privateschool-enrollment-cities-highest/ [ https://perma.cc/VME8-XJAC ]. Parents in large metropolitan
areas almost always have the option of moving to a relatively nearby suburb with high-performing
public schools. So even if parents choose to live in a city with low-performing public schools and send
their children to private school, thereby funding public schools from which they receive no direct
benefit from, the fact that there was almost certainly a wealthy, subsidized suburb within commuting
distance went into their calculation of where to live. Even when the local tax deduction’s subsidy does
not move the line enough to cause private school households to move to the suburbs, it nonetheless
moves the line, which affects taxpayers who are on the margin. See also Private School Enrollment, NAT’L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgc.asp [ https://perma.cc/
6D8P-H52E ] (May 2020) (noting that approximately ninety percent of children attend public school).
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has caused at least some taxpayers to choose a wealthy, economically segregated
locality over another less wealthy, less segregated locality, then the deduction has
contributed, at least somewhat, to the rise in economic segregation among
households with children.
Another way to analyze whether the deduction has contributed to the rise in
economic segregation is to examine whether people sort into localities based on a
locality’s tax and benefit package. Taxpayer sorting based on localities’ tax and
benefit packages would strongly indicate that the deduction’s reward for economic
segregation can and has contributed to the rise in economic segregation. The
Tiebout model discussed above posits that in a theoretical world with no obstacles
to moving, people would choose where to live based exclusively on this tax and
benefit combination.142 Perfect sorting based on taxes and benefits is unrealistic
because there are many obstacles to mobility, including the costs of physically
moving, lack of information about which benefits taxes are purchasing, and many
other noneconomic considerations that taxpayers consider when deciding where to
live, such as family proximity.143 Despite these obstacles to perfect sorting, certain
households can and do sort based on one variable, as Part I established: households
with children sort into wealthier localities at higher rates than any other group,
presumably because this enables their children to attend better local schools.144 This
implies that local school quality is the key “purchase” that households with children
make when choosing a locality’s tax and benefit package.145 The fact that certain
households sort based on high-quality local schools indicates that the deduction’s
subsidy, which makes good schools even better, has contributed to economic
segregation by amplifying the incentive for the wealthy to segregate.146 Furthermore,

142. See supra Section I.A.
143. Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J.
1267, 1311 (2013); Shaviro, supra note 10, at 964 (“Exit often is costly.”); see William W. Bratton
& Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a
Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 233–34 (1997) (discussing the implausibility of the Tiebout model
due to costs associated with mobility). Even Tiebout himself characterized his theoretical model as
“extreme.” Tiebout, supra note 46, at 419–20.
144. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. Households with children are generally able
to access information about the quality of local schools either online or through their social networks.
See FISCHEL, supra note 139, at 61. Although education for children of wealthy families is obviously
important, schools in wealthier school districts are naturally able to raise more revenue through local
taxes and are the least in need of a subsidy (that is not available to poor localities) from the
federal government.
145. A significant determinant of whether taxes paid equal public goods and services received
is whether taxpayers make a deliberate choice to live in localities that provide the taxpayer’s preferred
combination of taxes paid and public goods and services received. Because families with children
choose to economically segregate into wealthier localities, thereby effectively purchasing higher quality
education through their local taxes, the local taxes those families pay are a form of consumption, and
therefore do not warrant a deduction.
146. For discussions of how high-quality schools affect housing prices, see David N. Figlio
& Maurice E. Lucas, What’s in a Grade? School Report Cards and the Housing Market, 94
AM. ECON. REV. 591 (2004); Sandra E. Black, Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of
Elementary Education, 114 Q.J. ECON. 577 (1999); Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying
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wealthy taxpayers have shown an ability to sort into wealthy school districts without
even moving, as wealthy communities that are part of larger, economically
heterogeneous localities have increasingly separated to form their own smaller,
wealthy, economically segregated cities and school districts.147
This Article, which is focused on a theory behind the relationship between
economic segregation and the local tax deduction, does not argue that the theory
explains the behavior of all localities (which are each unique) and does not purport
to empirically prove the existence of that relationship. However, as illustrated in the
Introduction, there is anecdotal evidence to support this Article’s claims regarding
the relationship between economic segregation and the local tax deduction,
including the reaction of Scarsdale and other ultra-wealthy localities to tax reform’s
recent, temporary $10,000 ceiling on the state and local tax deduction.148 In addition,
if the deduction does reward economic segregation by subsidizing wealthy localities,
we would expect to see a premium for housing in those localities. One way to test
whether the deduction creates a premium for homes located in wealthy localities
would be to measure housing values with and without the deduction. Tax reform’s
temporary $10,000 limitation created an opportunity to conduct that test.149
Economists who measured home values before and after the ceiling found that the
$10,000 ceiling reduced home values in wealthy localities but not poor localities.150
This implies that the local tax deduction rewards economic segregation by adding
value to homes in wealthy localities, but not poor localities, and that therefore
wealthy localities receive more of a benefit from the state and local tax deduction
than less wealthy localities.151
The magnitude of the relationship between economic segregation and the local
tax deduction is relevant to whether and how the government should act. As
Schools: School Choice and the Social Construction of School Quality, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 177, 185
(2002) (stating that high-quality schools have “driven up housing prices”); Wallace E. Oates, The Effects
of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax
Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957, 966–67 (1969).
147. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text. For a discussion of tax reform and the
$10,000 ceiling, see infra Part III.
149. Although the ceiling capped the deductibility for a taxpayer’s combined state and local
taxes at $10,000, the ceiling effectively limits the deductibility of local taxes to $10,000 minus state taxes.
Because most wealthy taxpayers pay close to or more than $10,000 in state taxes alone, under the ceiling,
there is no federal reward for wealthy taxpayers to live in localities that charge high local tax rates.
150. See Tankersley, supra note 26 (controlling for the other provisions of the TCJA, finding
that only the state and local tax deduction had an effect on housing prices, and noting that the changes
are “contained to a few high-priced, highly taxed ZIP codes”).
151. Assuming the housing market is efficient, we would expect to see housing prices in
subsidized localities reflect the federal subsidy, which initially seems to indicate that taxpayers cannot
get more than what they pay for. For example, there is a premium for housing located near top scoring
schools. See supra note 146. However, additional amounts a taxpayer pays for a home in a subsidized
locality goes into the basis of the home, so the value of the subsidy generally remains with the taxpayer
(thus enabling them to, in the long run, get more than what they pay for). On the other hand, due to
the time value of money, the step up at death, etc., it seems likely they purchase some portion of their
increased local goods and services through higher home prices.
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explained above, there are two rewards for economic segregation, the first of which
(minimizing redistribution) is independent of the local tax deduction.152 If the
wealthy segregate primarily to minimize redistribution, and not because of the better
goods and services that are subsidized by the deduction, then while segregation may
be a concerning trend, it is unlikely to be influenced by tax policy. It is impossible
to completely disaggregate the effects of each reward since money is fungible and
both rewards allow wealthy localities to provide better goods and services at a
discount. However, even if the first reward is the primary reason for the increase in
economic segregation among households with children, the federal government
should not further reward the wealthy for segregating into wealthy-only localities.
III. REFORMING THE LOCAL DEDUCTION
One could criticize the wealthy for choosing to live in exclusive, wealthy
localities, but that choice is entirely rational based on economic incentives that are
created, in part, by the federal government.153 This Part addresses several ways that
Congress could level the tax playing field among localities, thereby reducing the
local tax deduction’s incentive to economically segregate.
A. Tax Reform’s $10,000 Ceiling
Before the recent tax reform legislation, taxpayers who itemized could deduct
the full amount of their state and local taxes, other than sales taxes, from their
federal taxable income.154 The TCJA, which was enacted in 2017 and took effect in
2018, added a $10,000 ceiling to the state and local tax deduction. Therefore, starting
in 2018, taxpayers who pay more than $10,000 in state and local taxes receive no
federal tax benefit for state and local taxes that exceed $10,000. The $10,000 ceiling
is set to expire in 2025, barring any legislative changes, at which point it (and many
other individual income tax provisions) will revert to the pre-2018 law.155
152. People do not need to be aware of or understand either reward to respond to the rewards.
If local goods and services, such as the local schools, are better as a result of homogeneity and the local
tax deduction, and households choose a particular locality as a result of the locality’s better local goods
and services, then the choice to economically segregate is a result of either or both of the rewards,
regardless of whether they are directly aware of either subsidy.
153. See Edsall, supra note 71 (quoting E-mail from Timothy Smeeding, Professor of
Pub. Affs. & Econ., Univ. of Wis., to Thomas B. Edsall) (“The well-to-do are isolated from the day to
day struggles of the middle class and below to provide these key services (health, education, job search
and other opportunities) to aid the upward mobility of their children. But the upper middle class are
happy to take advantage of tax subsidies for their own housing, preschool for their kids, and saving for
college which benefit them.”).
154. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054, 2085–86 (2017);
I.R.C. § 164(b)(6). Sales taxes may be deducted in lieu of income taxes, although relatively few taxpayers
do. See SOI Tax Stats - Individual Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete Report), IRS, https:/
/www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-publication-1304-complete-report
[ https://perma.cc/4W7V-XD9C ] (Sept. 3, 2020) (compiling statistics on returns with itemized
deductions in Table 2.1).
155. President Trump and members of the Republican Party have proposed making these
changes permanent, although it is unclear whether Congress will be able to garner enough votes to
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The new $10,000 ceiling on the federal deduction for state and local taxes was
and remains one of the most controversial provisions in the TCJA.156 Capping the
deduction is projected to raise approximately $668 billion over the next ten years
and was one of the primary ways that the Republican Party funded tax reform’s
significant tax cuts (other than increasing the deficit).157 These savings to the federal
government come at the expense of taxpayers who used to receive a greater benefit
from the deduction. States with high state and local taxes, which are primarily blue
states, have remained vehemently opposed to the $10,000 ceiling and sued the
federal government to overturn the effects of the ceiling.158 These states “have
viewed the ceiling as little short of a congressional declaration of war on blue states,
and they have prepared to respond in kind.”159 Several tax scholars have also
strongly opposed the deduction, although their arguments have focused primarily
on technical workarounds to the deduction, not whether the deduction incentivizes
economic segregation.160
Because blue states tend to have higher state and local taxes than red states, a
higher percentage of blue-state taxpayers pay more than $10,000 in state and local
taxes than red-state taxpayers, and therefore blue-state constituents were
disproportionately affected by the $10,000 ceiling. Blue-state politicians
unsurprisingly have sharply criticized the ceiling. They have attempted to create
several workarounds designed to allow their residents to deduct more than $10,000
in state and local taxes despite the ceiling, and these attempts have garnered
significant media and political attention. For example, New York enacted several
workarounds, including expanding employers’ options to convert employee wages
to employer payroll taxes (which are not subject to a deductibility cap) and various
credits against local property taxes for contributions to certain state charities.161
revisit the ceiling on the state and local tax deduction before it sunsets. The reason why Congress was
forced to make the changes temporary was because the TCJA was a reconciliation bill, which can make
use of the “Byrd Rule.” This rule allows congressional budget bills to avoid a filibuster in the Senate
and instead receive a straight yes or no vote, effectively requiring only 51 votes instead of 60. It was
necessary for Republicans to go through this process because Republicans held only 51 seats in
the Senate.
156. Lawrence Zelenak, SALT Ceiling Workarounds and Tax Shelters, 89 TAX NOTES ST. 521,
521 (2018) (“The new $10,000 ceiling on the deduction for state and local taxes has been among the
most widely publicized and controversial features of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97).”).
157. See supra note 7.
158. See supra note 8.
159. Zelenak, supra note 156, at 521.
160. In particular, eight tax scholars co-authored an article arguing that the law supports a
charitable contribution deduction for gifts that entitle them to a state tax credit. See David Gamage,
Joseph Bankman, David Gamage, Jacob Goldin, Daniel Hemel, Darien Shanske, Kirk J. Stark, Dennis
J. Ventry Jr. & Manoj Viswanathan, State Responses to Federal Tax Reform: Charitable Tax Credits, 159
TAX NOTES FED. 641 (2018).
161. See Zelenak, supra note 156 (discussing New York’s proposed payroll tax and charitable
contribution workarounds); Darla Mercado & Sarah O’Brien, Blue States File Suit Against Federal
Government Over SALT Caps, CNBC (July 17, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/17/
blue-states-file-suit-against-federal-government-over-new-tax-law.html
[ https://perma.cc/
J3LP-C9KB ].
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Several other states have taken similar measures.162 In response, Treasury issued
regulations that limited the effectiveness of these workarounds by applying quid pro
quo rules to charitable contributions made to states, effectively ending attempts to
use ostensibly charitable contributions in order to deduct over $10,000 in state and
local taxes.163 Politicians continue to heavily debate the political issues surrounding
the ceiling, but they have paid little attention to whether the ceiling is normatively
desirable from a tax policy perspective.164 Congress seems to have stumbled upon
the $10,000 limitation for budgetary, rather than tax policy, reasons, and in fact,
Congress originally proposed a deduction only for local taxes before relenting at the
last minute and allowing a deduction for both state and local taxes.
This Part attempts to step back from the contentious politics of the state and
local tax deduction and analyze what good tax policy would be with respect to the
deduction in light of the deduction’s effect on economic segregation discussed
above. This Article shows that, while there are previously unmentioned merits to
the ceiling compared to full deductibility, there are several aspects of the ceiling that
are problematic from a tax policy perspective. Starting with the ceiling’s merits, it
reduces the economic reward for the wealthy to segregate into wealthy localities by
drastically cutting the federal subsidy for wealthy localities.165 This is supported by
the fact that the ceiling has reduced housing values primarily in wealthy
neighborhoods and has had no effect on housing values in poor neighborhoods,
indicating that deduction primarily rewards wealthy neighborhoods and that the
ceiling reduced that reward.166 Therefore, deduction mitigates the economic
segregation concerns raised in this Article.167 Furthermore, because the ceiling is

162. See Bankman et al., supra note 160; Zelenak, supra note 156, at 521 (discussing the strategies
taken by New Jersey and California).
163. See, e.g., Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, 84 Fed. Reg. 27,513
( June 13, 2019).
164. See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Repeal of SALT Deduction More About Politics
than Policy, 156 TAX NOTES FED. 137 (2017) (discussing why cutting the deduction was sensible from
a tax policy perspective, but noting that political discussions surrounding the deduction focused on redblue state interests and revenue issues).
165. Although there is not an ordering rule to the state and local tax deduction, in effect, the
current deduction for local taxes is equal to $10,000 minus state taxes paid, which will approach zero
dollars for most upper middle class and wealthy taxpayers. To illustrate, a relatively wealthy person will
often exceed the $10,000 ceiling in state taxes alone, especially in relatively high-tax states, meaning that
they effectively get no deduction for local taxes and that wealthy localities receive little to no federal tax
subsidy from the local tax deduction. Therefore, the $10,000 ceiling will heavily impact those who live
in wealthier localities, where taxpayers often exceed $10,000 in state taxes, but will have much less
impact on middle-income localities and virtually no effect on poorer localities.
166. See supra note 100.
167. Even though the ceiling removes the federal subsidy for wealthy localities, it does not affect
the other reward for economic segregation—those who live in wealthy-only localities are still
economically rewarded by the fact that their local taxes do not subsidize the less wealthy. See supra
Section II.C. However, the ceiling does mean that residents of wealthy localities are less likely to pay
less than dollar-for-dollar for their local goods and services. To frame this in Tiebout-like terms, the
ceiling makes it less likely that the wealthy can get more than what they pay for as a result of economic
segregation. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
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already enacted (albeit as a temporary tax provision) and efforts to make it
permanent have already garnered some political support, making it permanent may
be more politically feasible than many of the other ways to ameliorate the causes
and effects of economic segregation.
The $10,000 ceiling is an imperfect tool for several reasons. For some
taxpayers, it limits deductibility for state taxes, for which a deduction is generally
considered “fair” and justified under a tax policy analysis.168 Furthermore, limiting
deductibility for state taxes could result in states raising less than the ideal amount
of state tax revenue, including revenue for redistributive state spending for
low-income school districts.169 The ceiling also limits deductibility for certain local
taxes that operate like state taxes—either due to the locality being large and
heterogeneous or due to state-forced redistribution among localities—and which
should therefore also be deductible.170
A further issue with the ceiling is that it allows for disparate treatment of
taxpayers who pay the same aggregate amount of state and local taxes, but whose
makeup of state versus local taxes varies. Taxpayers with a combination of low state
taxes and high local taxes will personally benefit from the deduction more than a
taxpayer with high state taxes and low local taxes. In the latter scenario, a higher
percentage of that taxpayer’s taxes will fund redistributive goods and services. To
illustrate, assume Taxpayer A paid $8,000 in state taxes, from which she derived no
direct benefit, and $2,000 in local taxes, from which she derived $2,000 in local
goods and services.171 Taxpayer B paid $1,000 in state taxes, from which she derived
no direct benefit, and $9,000 in local taxes, from which she derived $9,000 in local
goods and services. Both Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B can deduct their full $10,000

168. See supra Section II.B; supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (discussing tax policy
justifications for deductibility and counterarguments against deductibility).
169. See Nora Gordon, Opinion, How the Tax Bill Hurts the Poorest Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/opinion/congress-tax-bill-education.html
[ https://perma.cc/H7T7-DZ29 ] (“State-level school spending is critical. Economic segregation across
school districts means that some areas need an infusion of resources to have a chance at serving their
students well, and states are the primary source of that infusion. Research shows that when states send
more resources to their neediest districts, achievement levels in those districts rise.”); Michael
Leachman, SALT “Compromise”: Similar Harm to States as Full Repeal, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Oct. 31, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/salt-compromise-similar-harmto-states-as-full-repeal [ https://perma.cc/FCU6-C9VD ] (“[T]he deduction makes higher-income
filers more willing to support state taxes, because they can reduce the federal taxes that they owe by
deducting these state taxes. Repealing the deduction would make it harder for states—many of which
already face serious budget strains—to raise sufficient revenues in the coming years to invest in
high-quality education, infrastructure, and other priorities crucial to the nation’s long-term
economic prospects.”).
170. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
171. This illustration is simplified in its assumption that Taxpayers A and B do not get back
more or less than what they paid for with their local taxes. Although that assumption is unrealistic, it is
generally true that local taxes are less redistributive than state taxes and that, therefore, taxpayers who
pay a higher percentage of local taxes will generally receive more a benefit from their aggregate taxes
than taxpayers who pay the same total amount of state and local taxes but who pay a higher percentage
of those taxes as state taxes.
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combined state and local taxes, but Taxpayer B is better off because she got back
$7,000 more from her taxes than Taxpayer A. Although disparities exist in the tax
treatment of taxpayers like Taxpayers A and B, the ceiling vastly reduces disparities
in tax treatment because it limits such situations to a maximum of
$10,000 differences.172
Although the ceiling removes the federally created incentive for localities to
charge higher local taxes, the fact that the ceiling is temporary makes it difficult to
predict how quickly and to what extent wealthy localities will respond by lowering
(or otherwise choosing not to raise) their tax rates in connection with the ceiling’s
diminished federal subsidy.173 However, this uncertainty does not affect the
normative desirability of the cap. Wealthy localities that were previously subsidized,
but which lost the vast majority of their subsidy due to the $10,000 ceiling, can
choose to either keep their tax rate the same, thus forcing their residents who are
subject to the ceiling to pay more for the same level of goods and services, or lower
their tax rates and reduce the amount or quality of their local goods and services.
Either way, the fact that residents of wealthy, economically homogenous localities
now pay more for the same goods and services is not a problem from a tax policy
perspective because the residents have the choice of moving to a locality that more
closely matches their preferences or staying put and paying the unsubsidized
amount for their local goods and services.
B. Improving the $10,000 Ceiling
Although the $10,000 ceiling reduces the federal subsidy available only to
wealthy, homogeneous localities, other approaches would better achieve the goal of
disincentivizing economic segregation.174 One way to reform the deduction would
involve allowing greater deductibility for state taxes than local taxes. Because state
taxes are relatively redistributive, and therefore full deductibility is justifiable from
a tax policy perspective, one alternative would be to allow full deductibility for state
taxes.175 Congress could keep this option relatively revenue neutral, which is often
crucial for political reasons, by limiting deductibility for local taxes.176 Alternatively,

172. For example, absent the $10,000 ceiling, if Taxpayer C paid $1,000 in state taxes, from
which she derived no direct benefit, and $39,000 in local taxes, from which she derived $40,000 in local
goods and services, Taxpayer C would be significantly better off than both Taxpayers A and B because
she would get $39,000 in local goods and services and would be paying for those goods and services
with tax deductible dollars. Although the $10,000 ceiling still leaves Taxpayer C in a better position than
Taxpayer A, it limits the discrepancy in tax treatment because Taxpayer C (appropriately) had to pay
dollar-for-dollar for every local good and service beyond the combined $10,000 in state and local taxes.
173. Even if Congress makes the ceiling permanent, any effects on tax rates and economic
segregation would be slow to be realized due to limitations on taxpayer mobility and the politics
involved in changing tax rates.
174. Because the $10,000 ceiling was one of the primary ways that the TCJA funded tax reform’s
significant tax cuts, it seems likely that politically viable alternatives to the $10,000 ceiling must also
raise revenue. Therefore, this Section focuses on alternatives to full deductibility.
175. See supra Section II.B.
176. See supra Section II.B.
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the federal government could put a cap on the deductibility of local taxes but not
state taxes or put a lower cap on local taxes than state taxes. The federal government
could also allow greater or full deductibility for sales and income taxes, which are
primarily charged by states, but cap deductibility for property taxes, which are
primarily charged by localities.177 There are endless iterations of these options, but
generally, options that make state taxes comparatively more deductible than local
taxes are better than the current $10,000 ceiling because they would reduce the
federal subsidy that rewards economic segregation while maintaining the federal
subsidy for state taxes. Although these options are likely an improvement on the
current $10,000 ceiling, they are still less than ideal to the extent they limit
deductibility for local taxes that are redistributive, either due to the locality being
large and redistributive or due to state-forced redistribution among the localities.178
In other words, making state taxes more deductible than local taxes is more targeted
than the current $10,000 ceiling but is still an imperfectly blunt instrument; although
it would reduce the subsidy for wealthy, homogenous localities, it would also reduce
the subsidy for other localities for which a deduction is more justified.
A similar, but more targeted way to reform the deduction would be to allow
for full (or greater) deductibility of state taxes but disallow or limit deductibility for
local taxes based on whether the locality is economically segregated.179 For example,
Congress could reform the deduction to include a dissimilarity index that measured
economic segregation within the local taxing jurisdiction and limit deductibility in
proportion to the level of economic segregation. This option is ideal from a tax
policy perspective because it adjusts for consumption by specifically targeting
wealthy, homogenous localities, but its administrability is more complicated than
other alternatives that do not explicitly account for actual levels of
economic segregation.
A different approach would get rid of the local deduction altogether and
replace it with a refundable credit for all taxpayers for local taxes paid, with the
credit rate set at ten percent. Because ten percent is the lowest positive marginal
rate, this alternative would equalize the subsidy between high- and low-income
individuals. In addition, making the credit refundable would extend it to all
177. But see David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Future of SALT: A Broader Picture, 88 TAX
NOTES ST. 1275, 1277 (2018) (explaining that property taxes are more stable than other forms of state
and local taxes, and therefore there are merits to keeping or expanding deductibility for property taxes).
178. Furthermore, there is the possibility that localities and states could redefine certain local
taxes as state taxes, therefore circumventing the effectiveness of this type of reform.
179. If Congress limited deductibility for local taxes, thereby decreasing the federal subsidy for
localities, residents of wealthy localities could respond by increasing their individual charitable
donations to local charities and local schools. See ROB REICH, JUST GIVING: WHY PHILANTHROPY IS
FAILING DEMOCRACY AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 87–89 (2018) (discussing how wealthy taxpayers
make charitable contributions to wealthy schools). Although allowing a charitable deduction for
donations to wealthy schools may be bad tax policy, the deduction for charitable organizations is outside
the scope of this Article. Furthermore, making a donation to a charitable organization or local school
does not reduce a taxpayer’s local tax liability, and therefore should not affect policy decisions regarding
the local tax deduction.
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taxpayers, including low-income taxpayers, which would allow low-income localities
to charge higher taxes, and therefore provide better goods and services, as a result
of the credit.180
Even though each of these alternatives is likely better from a tax policy
perspective than the current $10,000 ceiling, the history behind the ceiling shows
why it would be politically difficult to limit or eliminate deductibility for local taxes
while keeping deductibility for state taxes. During the tax reform debate, an early
version of the Senate’s bill included a full repeal of the deduction.181 Congress
considered this primarily for budgetary reasons and would have raised over $100
billion per year, but ultimately rejected it.182 Another version of the bill would have
reformed the deduction so that taxpayers could deduct up to $10,000 of their local
property taxes, but not their state taxes.183 Ultimately, Congress expanded the
$10,000 ceiling to include all forms of state and local taxes. However, no version of
the bill permitted taxpayers to deduct more of their state taxes than their local taxes.
One explanation for this is pressure from powerful real estate lobbyists, who
predicted that limiting deductibility for state and local taxes would cause housing
prices to drop and strongly advocated against any ceiling on local tax deductibility.184
Real estate lobbyists are strongly motivated to keep some form of deductibility for
local property taxes but not for state taxes because the vast majority of local tax
revenue comes from property taxes, which are tied to home value. States primarily
raise revenue through income and sales taxes, which are not tied to home value. The
fact that the powerful real estate lobby and high-tax jurisdictions have such a keen

180. See also Gamage & Shanske, supra note 177, at 1277 (proposing several ways to reform the
state and local tax deduction and arguing that making the deduction an above-the-line deduction or a
credit would make it more progressive).
181. Alan Rappeport, Dueling Tax Plans: Here’s What the Senate and House Have to Resolve,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/business/dueling-tax-plansheres-what-the-senate-and-house-have-to-resolve.html [ https://perma.cc/R8LW-J5VA ] (noting that
the Senate version of the tax reform bill contained a full repeal of the state and local tax deduction while
the House version contained a $10,000 limitation).
182. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting that in 2017 alone, the state and local tax
deduction cost the federal government $100.9 billion).
183. Earlier versions of the TCJA would have allowed taxpayers to deduct up to $10,000 of
their local property taxes only (as opposed to $10,000 of their state and local taxes). See Shobe, supra
note 112; Rappeport, supra note 181.
184. Kelly Phillips Erb, Realtors Predict Tax Bill Will Cause Housing Prices to Drop in Every
State, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2017, 1:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2017/12/01/
realtors-predict-tax-bill-will-cause-housing-prices-to-drop-in-every-state/#209a41d630fb
[ https://
perma.cc/3AMC-HSRQ ] (discussing how the National Association of Realtors predicted that changes
to the state and local tax deduction and the home mortgage interest deduction would cause housing
prices to drop). Despite predictions that the tax bill would cause housing prices to drop, housing prices
increased in the months after the TCJA was enacted. See Herbert Lash, Pricey U.S. Home Sales Soar as
Buyers Ignore New Tax Code, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2018, 4:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-property-tax-homes-analysis/pricey-u-s-home-sales-soar-as-buyers-ignore-new-tax-code-idUS
KBN1HR1JN [ https://web.archive.org/web/20180518121422/https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-property-tax-homes-analysis/pricey-u-s-home-sales-soar-as-buyers-ignore-new-tax-code-idUSKB
N1HR1JN ].
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interest in deductibility for property taxes makes any proposal that would further
limit deductibility for local taxes politically unlikely. Furthermore, because Congress
needs to maintain the $10,000 ceiling in order to fund the other tax reform
provisions and because there are no interest groups with strong interests in
expanding deductibility for state taxes, expanding deductibility for state taxes is
unlikely as well.185 Although attaining good tax policy is difficult in light of political
pressures surrounding the deduction, the current $10,000 ceiling on the state and
local tax deduction is far from the best normative answer to what kinds of
subnational taxes should be deductible, even if in many ways it is better policy than
unlimited deductibility.186
CONCLUSION
Economic segregation is on the rise among households with children,
increasing the economic disparities between wealthy and poor localities and
compounding the causes and effects of intergenerational income inequality. The
local tax deduction rewards, and likely contributes to, economic segregation because
it disproportionately subsidizes wealthy localities, amplifying the incentive for the
wealthy to segregate into wealthy, economically homogeneous localities. This
insight has important tax policy implications for recent debates surrounding the
deductibility of state and local taxes.

185. See Joseph C. Mandarino, Evaluation of Efforts to Combat the SALT Deduction Cap, 87
TAX NOTES ST. 1061, 1061 (2018) (discussing the fact that it would be difficult to raise the $10,000
ceiling “without significant economic or political cost”).
186. Other, non-tax ways to reduce economic segregation also face strong political barriers.
Some of these options include removing restrictive zoning regulations, housing assistance and vouchers,
school busing, and redrawing school district boundaries. For articles discussing how these policies can
reduce economic segregation, see ROTHWELL, supra note 38, at 2 (“[L]imiting the development of
inexpensive housing in affluent neighborhoods and jurisdictions fuels economic . . . segregation and
contributes to significant differences in school performance across the metropolitan landscape.”);
Owens & Clampet-Lundquist, supra note 96, at 415 (noting that “housing assistance had long-lasting
effects, shaping the intergenerational durability of neighborhood poverty”); Michael C. Lens & Paavo
Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan Areas More Segregated by Income?, 82
J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 6, 7, 12 (2016). For articles that discuss the political unfeasibility of these options
to decrease economic segregation, see Paul Sperry, Obama’s Last Act Is to Force Suburbs to Be Less
White and Less Wealthy, N.Y. POST (May 8, 2016, 7:30 AM), https://nypost.com/2016/05/08/
obamas-last-act-is-to-force-suburbs-to-be-less-white-and-less-wealthy/ [ https://perma.cc/QB5MXBFA ] (discussing how housing vouchers have been blamed for spreading crime to wealthy suburbs);
Richard V. Reeves, The Dangerous Separation of the American Upper Middle Class, BROOKINGS
(Sept. 3, 2015), https://brookings.edu/research/the-dangerous-separation-of-the-american-uppermiddle-class/ [ https://perma.cc/24UV-2UY3 ] (“Efforts to increase redistribution, or loosen licensing
laws, or free up housing markets, or reform school admissions can all run into a solid wall of rational,
self-interested upper class resistance.”).
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